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Many philosophers assume that a belief can be rational only if the believer’s evidence 
supports it. But this view about rational beliefs faces a prima facie problem: it seems that it cannot 
explain why beliefs about hinge-propositions—the highly general propositions underlying all our 
ordinary empirical beliefs—are justified or rational. But if our beliefs about hinge-propositions are 
not rational, then that might mean that none of the beliefs that presuppose them or entail them are 
rational either. How can we avoid this consequence? 
In this dissertation, I develop a view that allows us to avoid this consequence. According to 
my view: (1) beliefs about hinge-propositions are not subject to any rational evaluation but are, 
instead, arational, and (2) these beliefs play a special role – that of informing our worldview at its 
core. This view does not entail that our ordinary empirical beliefs are irrational and is compatible 
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You believe that your wedding anniversary is on June 26th.  But what makes it rational for 
you to believe this? Perhaps it is that you remember having celebrated your wedding on that date in 
the past. But then what makes it rational for you to treat your memory of this specific event as 
accurate? Perhaps it is that your memory has almost always been accurate in the past. But then what 
makes it rational for you to treat your memory of this track record as accurate? 
Many philosophers assume that a belief can be rational only if the believer’s evidence 
supports it. But this view about rational beliefs faces a prima facie problem: it seems that it cannot 
explain why beliefs about the reliability of our belief-forming mechanisms—e.g., the belief that one’s 
memory is reliable—are justified or rational. Broadly speaking, the problem that evidentialist views 
about propositional justification face in these cases is that it seems that the empirical evidence we 
can conjure to support these beliefs itself presupposes the truth of those very beliefs. But this is 
problematic, because it means that this evidence is not suitably independent of the beliefs that it is 
supposed to support. Plausibly, such non-independent evidence cannot help to make an agent 
rational in believing that her belief-forming mechanism are reliable.  
Let us go back to our initial example to illustrate this problem. Your belief that your wedding 
anniversary is on June 26th is supported by your evidence that you remember that you have 
celebrated your anniversary on this day. But in taking this piece of evidence to be probative, you 
presuppose that your memory is reliable. What type of evidence would justify your belief that your 
memory is reliable? Seemingly, track-record data that indicates that most of the time, your memory 
is reliable. But again, to gather such track-record data, you need to rely on your memory. So in taking 
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yourself to have this evidence that your memory is reliable, again, you need to rely on the 
assumption that your memory is reliable. So, it seems that you cannot have any suitably independent 
evidence for your belief that your memory is reliable—and so that this belief cannot be rational. 
The problem here is not confined to propositions about the reliability of our memory, or 
even about the reliability of our belief-forming mechanisms more generally. Rather, it arises more 
broadly for the highly general presuppositions that lie behind most of our empirical beliefs: 
propositions like ‘there is an external world’, ‘I am not a brain in a vat’, ‘there are other minds’, and 
of course, ‘my perceptual faculties and memory are reliable’. Let us call these propositions hinge-
propositions, and the attitudes we have towards them hinge-commitments—to be open to the idea that 
these attitudes do not have to be beliefs. Hinge-propositions are presupposed whenever we take our 
evidence to support anything. Consequently, at least if evidence for a proposition must be suitably 
independent of that very proposition, hinge-propositions, it seems, cannot be supported by our 
evidence. Above we have seen one instance of this; let us consider one more. Take the hinge-
proposition that there is an external world—understood as a world populated by ordinary objects 
that are the objects of (at least some of) our perceptions. Any piece of empirical evidence that I 
might take to support the proposition that there is an external world must itself presuppose that 
there is an external world. For example, I might think that the ordinary empirical proposition that 
my cat is on the desk supports the proposition that there is an external world. But this ordinary 
empirical proposition is itself only true – and thus only part of my evidence – if my cat and the desk 
are two ordinary objects in a world full of such objects. Thus, in taking myself to have this evidence, 
I presuppose that there is an external world. This generalizes to any other ordinary empirical 
proposition, and so – it seems – no piece of evidence can support the proposition that there is an 
external world.  
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If hinge-propositions cannot be supported by our evidence, then we seem to confront a 
dilemma: either we must find a way in which hinge-propositions can be rational even though they 
are not supported by any piece of empirical evidence, or we must become skeptics. The threat of 
skepticism looms because it is not clear how we can be rational in believing any of the empirical 
propositions that presuppose our hinge-commitments if it is irrational for us to hold our hinge-
commitments.  
Recent “hinge-epistemologists” propose a way to avoid both horns of this dilemma. 
According to them, we need to think about hinge-propositions as falling outside the domain of the 
kind of epistemic appraisal we apply to ordinary empirical propositions. On this view, even if hinge-
commitments are not supported by the agent’s evidence, this does not mean that they are irrational; 
thus, there is no irrationality that can permeate through to our ordinary empirical beliefs. Existing 
hinge-epistemologist views argue that hinge-commitments are not beliefs but other belief-like mental 
states. Some of them argue that hinge-commitments are rational (in a non-evidentialist way) and 
others argue that they are neither rational nor irrational. In this dissertation, I put forward a novel 
version of hinge-epistemology on which hinge-commitments are arational beliefs – beliefs that are 
neither rational nor irrational. The novelty of my view is that, because I hold that hinge-propositions 
are bona fide beliefs, I also hold, contrary to all hinge-epistemologists, and virtually all 
epistemologists more broadly, that some of our beliefs – beliefs in hinge-propositions – are not 
subject to rational evaluation. A consequence of my view, then, is that beliefs can be rational, 
irrational or arational.  
The dissertation is constituted by three chapters. In the first chapter, “Ungrounded Beliefs”, 
I take up in more detail the question of whether hinge-commitments can be supported by one’s 
evidence, in a broad sense of ‘evidence’. Dogmatists have argued that we can, after all, have 
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empirical justification for our hinge-commitments.1 A priorists, on the other hand, have argued that 
we are a priori justified in holding them.2 I argue that neither of these approaches is satisfactory.  
On the empirical front, as others3 have remarked, dogmatism is subject to bootstrapping 
problems and so is unsuccessful. But even if dogmatism is false, one might nevertheless wonder 
whether we can have empirical justification for our hinge-commitments in some other way. My 
contribution to this debate is to offer an argument for the view that there cannot be any successful 
strategy on which we have empirical justification for hinge-propositions. Expanding on the intuitive 
idea presenting in the opening paragraphs of this Introduction, I argue that any putative piece of 
empirical evidence for our hinge-commitments is inconsistent with a plausible “Independence” 
principle for evidence, according to which some piece of evidence E supports some proposition P 
only if someone who does not already believe P can gain justification to believe P on the basis of E.  
On the a priori front, I argue that the two most influential a priorist strategies are subject to 
important criticisms. I argue that either the justification we supposedly get from a cognitive 
mechanism is not in fact entirely a priori, or the condition that is supposed to bring about a priori 
justification for hinge-propositions is irrelevant for this task. Given these problems for both the 
empirical and a priori strategies, I conclude that our hinge-commitments are ungrounded; they 
cannot be evidentially supported.   
In the second chapter, “Hinge-commitments as Arational Beliefs”, I argue for three claims. 
First, I argue, in light of the sorts of considerations presented in chapter one, that hinge-
commitments cannot be rational. Second, I argue that hinge-commitments must be beliefs, and not 
 
1 See, Pryor (2000). 
2 See Cohen (2010), DeRose (2018). 
3 See Cohen (2010), DeRose (2018), and White (2006). 
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some other sui generis mental state. But third, I argue and that these first two contentions do not 
require us to hold that hinge-commitments are irrational: rather, we should think of hinge-
commitments as arational beliefs.  
To support the first contention, I examine views according to which hinge-commitments 
can be rational despite not being supported by the evidence, and argue that such views are unable to 
fully explain why we are justified in holding hinge-commitments. In general, these views claim that 
we are rationally required to hold hinge-commitments in virtue of their being necessary prerequisites 
or enablers of rational deliberation. However, given that there are other enablers of rational 
deliberation that we clearly are not rationally required to hold, this claim must be false. To support 
the second contention, I argue that any view that holds that hinge-commitments are not beliefs has 
difficulties explaining why hinge-commitments play virtually all the same functional roles that other 
beliefs play.  
So: hinge-commitments must be beliefs, but they cannot be rational.  Does this imply that 
hinge-commitments are irrational? I argue that it does not. For any practice of epistemic appraisal, at 
least some hinge-commitments must fall outside the scope of that practice, and so given that hinge-
commitments are beliefs, this means that some beliefs are outside the domain epistemic evaluation: 
they are arational. Or so I argue. 
In the third chapter, “A Novel Normativist Approach to the Nature of Belief”, I explore one 
important consequence of the arational beliefs view of hinge-commitments: viz., that some beliefs 
are neither rational nor irrational. Normativism is a popular view about the nature of belief which 
broadly speaking defends the view that beliefs are normative by nature. According to all the current 
normativist accounts, beliefs are normative in the following way: beliefs are essentially subject to 
evidentialist norms of belief formation and management. I argue that this is a misconception of the 
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nature of belief. However, I argue that this need not be fatal to the normativist idea more broadly, 
and develop a new normativist account of belief. On my view—which I call the Commitment View 
of Belief—beliefs are normative not because they are subject to evidentialist norms, but because 
they subject the believer to norms of action, thought and feeling that flow from the believer’s 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. Whenever you have a belief that P, you are committed to 
the truth of P, and thus, to acting, feeling and thinking as if P is true. Thereby, you are rationally 

























CHAPTER 1. UNGROUNDED BELIEFS 
 
1. Introduction  
There is a popular story about why and when we have justification to believe ordinary 
empirical propositions like that there is a computer in front of me. That story, which following 
others I will call ‘evidentialism about justification’, says that we have justification to believe ordinary 
empirical propositions precisely when, and because, those propositions are sufficiently supported by 
the evidence that we possess. Regarding such ordinary empirical propositions as that there is a 
computer in front of me, it seems natural to think that, usually, they are sufficiently supported by 
our evidence. In this case, the perceptual experiences that I’m now having, together with my 
background knowledge of what computers look like jointly constitute sufficient evidential support 
for the proposition that there is a computer in front of me. Thus, I am justified in believing this 
proposition. This example is presumably representative; a similar story is presumably available for 
most of my other empirical beliefs. 
This evidentialist view about the nature of justification of our beliefs intuitively gives the 
right results most of the time when considering ordinary empirical propositions. But what does it tell 
us about certain very general propositions that are entailed by most of our ordinary empirical beliefs 
– for example, that we are not brains in vats, or that there is an external world, or that our senses 
are, by and large, reliable indicators of at least some of the features of the external world? Let us call 
propositions of this latter kind hinge-propositions, and the attitudes we have towards these 
propositions hinge-commitments.  
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Prima facie, it might seem that our hinge-commitments must be justified because they are 
entailed by all of our ordinary empirical beliefs. If our ordinary empirical beliefs are justified, and we 
know that our hinge-commitments are entailed by those beliefs, then by popular “closure” principles 
for justification it follows that our hinge-commitments are also justified. For example, if I am really 
justified in believing that there is a computer in front of me, then I must be justified in believing that 
there is an external world—a world of things (such as the computer) that exist independently of my 
awareness of them. But am I justified in believing this hinge-proposition?  
We have two pressing questions to answer:  
a) Do we have justification for believing hinge-propositions?  
And, if the answer to (a) is “yes”, then 
b) What kind of justification do we have for believing hinge-propositions?  
Many philosophers have a strong intuition that we have justification for believing hinge-
propositions, and so they answer yes to the first question. Those philosophers must then give some 
answer to question (b). But in trying to answer question (b), they face a choice: the justification we 
have for our hinge-propositions must be either empirical or a priori. Dogmatists have argued that 
the kind of justification we have for our hinge-propositions is empirical. A priorists have argued that 
it is a priori. But I will argue that neither of these responses to question (b) is satisfactory. More 
generally, I will argue that no answer to question (b) is satisfactory. We therefore cannot give an 
affirmative answer to question (a). 
The following is a roadmap of this paper. In section 2, I will briefly present the main highlights 
of dogmatism. Then, I will spell out some criticisms of dogmatism that authors have raised and that 
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seem persuasive to me,4 and I will introduce an additional problem for any other view that tries to 
argue that our justification for our hinge-commitments is empirical. Any view that tries to argue that 
the evidence we have for our hinge-commitments is empirical would violate an intuitive principle 
about evidence that I call ‘Independence’: namely, that any piece of evidence E supports some 
proposition P only if someone who does not already believe P can gain justification to believe P on 
the basis of E. 
In section 3, I will introduce two strategies for arguing that the justification we have for our 
hinge-commitments is a priori. I then will develop criticisms against each of them, concluding that 
these types of strategies fail. I will argue that on one way of developing the a priorist strategy, it leads 
to a type of justification that seems to be empirical and not a priori and so it runs into the objection 
raised in Section 2 against this view. I will argue that on the other way of developing the a priorist 
strategy, the feature they claim is enough to give us a priori justification (a particular phenomenology) 
is an irrelevant piece of evidence for the truth of our hinge-commitments.  
Finally, in section 4, as I have already mentioned, I will conclude this chapter with the following 
diagnosis: Hinge-commitments cannot be supported by the evidence—understanding ‘evidence’ 
broadly as including both empirical evidence and whatever generates a priori justification. This 
diagnosis seems threatening; it raises the question of whether we are thereby committed to 
skepticism. It also raises various questions about the nature and rational status of hinge-
commitments. These questions will be answered in the next two chapters of this dissertation.  
 
4 This problem has been identified as being referred to as the problem of easy knowledge or bootstrapping. For different 




One popular way to think about the justification of our hinge-commitments is developed by 
dogmatists.5 Dogmatists, broadly speaking, argue that our experiences give us immediate defeasible 
propositional justification for our ordinary perceptual beliefs, that is, a type of justification that does 
not depend on any evidence or justification we have for believing other propositions. In particular, 
according to dogmatism, our experiences give us this justification even in the absence of any 
antecedent justification for our hinge-commitments. However, it is in virtue of having this empirical 
justification that we also have defeasible empirical justification for our hinge-commitments. That is, 
according to the dogmatist I can be justified in believing, let us say, that there is a red table in front 
of me in virtue of having an experience or the phenomenology of a red table in front of me6 and in 
turn that same phenomenology would justify the hinge-commitments entailed by this ordinary 
empirical belief, such as that there is an external world of objects of my perceptions. Hence, 
dogmatists accept that we are justified in holding our hinge-commitments and they think that the 
justification we have for them is empirical.7  
As I have already mentioned, according to dogmatism, the type of justification we get from 
our experiences is defeasible; an experience with content p gives us justification to believe p absent 
defeaters. The justification for believing p that we get from our experience can be defeated in several 
ways: if we get evidence in favor of not-p—like when we realize we are perceiving an optical 
 
5 See, Pryor (2000). 
 
6 Here, I am simplifying the view. It is controversial what kind of experiences are the ones which give us immediate 
justification for their propositional content. Here, I’m just assuming that simple experiences about objects, colors and 
shapes are such that they confer immediate justification to believe their propositional content.  
  
7 Even though Pryor (2000, p.546) remains noncommittal on how hinge-propositions like ‘I am not a brain in a vat’ are 
justified, he suggests that he thinks the way I describe it is how it should go. For the purpose of this paper, I will assume 
that that dogmatism expands to hinge-propositions in the way I described (via closure).  
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illusion—or if we get evidence that points out that the truth of p is something that we cannot figure 
out by perception alone—like cases where we know it is likely that a wall we are seeing has been 
lighted red—if we get evidence that our senses are not working properly—like when one knows that 
one is under the hallucinatory effects of a drug—or by evidence that minimizes the importance that 
it seems to me that p—like if we were in a scenario where we had actual evidence that we are living 
in a simulation (cf. Pryor (2000; 534)). This is important for two reasons: (a) because dogmatists 
acknowledge that our knowledge about the world can change, and we can learn that something we 
used to believe was true is not, and (b) because it lays the ground for the dogmatist to clarify that 
only ordinary evidence—the type of evidence that working scientists and the man in the street would 
take to be evidence (Pryor (2000; 534))— could defeat the justification granted by our experiences. 
According to dogmatists, the mere possibility of skeptical scenarios does not constitute evidence 
against either our ordinary empirical beliefs or our hinge-commitments that defeats our perceptual 
justification for holding these beliefs.8  
A problem for dogmatists: easy knowledge, or bootstrapping  
Some philosophers9 have argued against dogmatism that it gives us implausibly easy knowledge 
or justification for our hinge-commitments. For example, they charge, the dogmatist must hold that 
from being justified or knowing that an object has a certain color, we can get to know by induction 
that our perception of color is reliable. The general idea is that dogmatism gives us a defeasible 
inference rule, let us call it the ‘Perceptual Inference Rule’, that allows us to conclude that p, from 
having a perceptual experience as of p (in the absence of any defeaters). 
 
8 However, actual evidence that we are, let us say, living in a simulation would count as relevant defeating evidence for the 
justification we get from our experiences.  
 
9 See Cohen (2010), DeRose (2018), and White (2006). 
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Perceptual Inference Rule (PIR) 
1. X looks C 
2. Therefore, X is C 
As shown by the following argument, the ‘Easy Knowledge Argument’, it seems that by using 
PIR along with our ordinary experiences, we can (justifiably, by the dogmatist’s lights) conclude 
something about the reliability of our perceptual mechanisms:  
‘Easy Knowledge Argument’: 
3. The book looks yellow. 
4. The book is yellow. (PIR & 3) 
5. The book looks yellow and it is yellow. (Conjunction intro of 3 and 4) 
6. My color vision worked correctly. (Trivial inference from 5) 
7. My color vision works correctly in a large number of cases. (By repeating the argument from 
3-6 for other appearances similar to 3, plus conjunction introduction) 
8. My color vision is generally reliable. (Trivial inference from 7) 
But clearly, this reasoning cannot support the conclusion stated in 8. If it did, then without 
looking for independent confirmation of the reliability of my vision, I would be able to (justifiably) 
conclude that my color vision is reliable solely on the basis of the reports of my color vision. This 
defective procedure is usually called ‘bootstrapping’.10 That the argument from 3 to 8 involves 
bootstrapping makes it at least intuitively suspicious.   
The Easy Knowledge Argument is strikingly similar to another argument whereby, from 
premises about our perceptions, we conclude that we are not brains in a vat (which are programmed 
 
10 See Cohen (2002), White (2006). 
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to have the same experiences as someone who is not a brain in a vat would have). Let us call this 
reasoning the ‘External World-Easy Knowledge Argument’: 
‘External World-Easy Knowledge Argument’ 
9. It looks like there is an object in front of me. 
10. There is an object in front of me. (By PIR & 9) 
11. It looks like there is an object in front of me and there is an object in front of me. 
(Conjunction intro of 9 and 10) 
12. My perception correctly reports the presence of an external object. (Trivial inference from 
11) 
13. Therefore, there are external objects that I am interacting with and that are the object of my 
perceptions. (Trivial inference from 12) 
14. Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat (programmed to have the same experiences as someone 
who is not a brain in a vat would have). (Trivial inference from 13) 
This argument, again, seems to give us too much knowledge or justification given what we 
started with. It seems suspicious that merely on the basis of how things seem to us, we can make a 
justified inference to, or come to know, the conclusion that these very seemings are tracking an 
independent reality rather than being programmed experiences being fed to a brain in a vat. We are 
facing bootstrapping again.   
The External World-Easy Knowledge argument seems suspicious in just the same way that the 
original Easy Knowledge Argument is suspicious. Yet the dogmatist seems committed to both 
arguments being good. Indeed, the External World-Easy Knowledge argument just is the dogmatist 
strategy for explaining how we can come to be justified in believing that we are not brains in vats. 
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That the dogmatist view entails that we can get easy knowledge in the ways described in these two 
arguments is an unwelcome result that seems to undermine dogmatism.  
There have been several attempts to diagnose what goes wrong in the kind of reasoning that 
leads us to bootstrapping problems not only for dogmatism but for other foundationalist theories as 
well.11 Each attempt identifies a defective reasoning pattern that seems to underlie bootstrapping 
reasoning and recommends a ban on the use of those defective types of reasoning. If dogmatism can 
be supplemented by such a ban, then it may no longer be vulnerable to the bootstrapping problem. 
In a survey paper, Weisberg (2012) presents persuasive criticisms of each of these attempts. The fact 
that these attempts face such criticisms suggests that it is not easy for dogmatism to avoid the easy 
knowledge problem. However, Weisberg (2010) himself develops what seems to be a very promising 
way for dogmatism to avoid bootstrapping that does better than the previous attempts. Broadly 
speaking, Weisberg thinks that we should ban arguments where the initial premises of the argument 
(or “the roots” of the argument) do not probabilistically support the conclusion of the argument—
even if some intermediate claims derived from these initial premises do probabilistically support the 
conclusion. Consider the following two arguments (cf. Weisberg 2012; 603-604): 
Good Reasoning: 
i. The Times reports that unemployment is down. 
ii. So, unemployment is down. 
iii. So, the economy is growing. 
Forbidden Reasoning:  
iv. The Times reports that unemployment is down. 
v. So, unemployment is down. 
 
11  See for example Cohen (2002), Pryor (2004), Roush (2005), and Vogel (2008). 
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vi. So, the Times report is not a fabrication. 
Good Reasoning would be allowed in Weisberg’ view because (i) probabilistically supports (iii), 
but Forbidden Reasoning would not be allowed because (iv) does not, by itself, probabilistically 
support (vi).  
In this way, according to Weisberg’s view, we would not be allowed to reason as prescribed by 
the Easy Knowledge Argument, because premise 3 (“the book looks yellow”) does not 
probabilistically support conclusion 8 (“my color vision is reliable”). By exactly the same token, we 
would also not be able to reason as prescribed by the External World Easy Knowledge Argument, 
since premise 9 (“it looks like there is an object in front of me”) does not probabilistically support 
conclusion 14 (“I am not a brain in a vat”). Consequently, if dogmatism is supplemented with a ban 
of the kind Weisberg recommends, then it no longer gives us justification for our hinge 
commitments – since, as White (2006) has argued12, propositions about seemings do not 
probabilistically support our hinge-commitments. So even if dogmatism itself can avoid the 
bootstrapping problem by appealing to the sort of ban Weisberg recommends, such a ban also 
means that dogmatism cannot explain how our hinge-commitments are justified.13 Therefore, it 
 
12 The following is a modified version of White’s argument: Let ‘BIV’ be the proposition that I am a brain in a vat being 
fed exactly the appearances that I am in fact having, and let ‘A’ be the proposition that I am having the appearances that 
I am having. Then P(A│BIV)=1, and so it follows from Bayes’s Theorem that P(BIV│A)≥ P(BIV). But then 
P(~BIV│A)≤ P(~BIV) and so, by basic axioms of probability, A does not support (or makes it more likely that) ~BIV. 
In other words, given that having the experiences I am having supports (or makes it more likely that) BIV, the same 
experiences cannot support (or make it more likely that) ~BIV.  
 
13 So far, I have been granting closure principles of justification for the sake of argument—even though, as I will note in 
the conclusion of this dissertation, I deny that closure principles of justification apply to hinge-propositions. However, a 
dogmatist might deny closure principles of justification to avoid the Easy Knowledge Problem. Even if this version of 
dogmatism avoids this problem, however, it would not be a version of dogmatist that explains how hinge-commitments 
are justified since without such closure principles, justification couldn’t transmit from our experiences to our hinge-




seems that we should look somewhere else for an explanation for of the justification of our hinge-
commitments.14 
Hinge-commitments cannot be adequately supported by empirical evidence  
Dogmatism seems to fall short of proving that our experiences can give us immediate 
justification for our hinge-commitments. So this way of thinking about empirical justification for our 
hinge-commitments fails. At this point, someone might wonder whether there might be another way 
to show that we are justified in believing our hinge-commitment a posteriori. In what follows, I will 
offer an argument to suggest that no strategy that tries to use empirical evidence to show that we are 
justified in holding our hinge-commitments can succeed.  
Consider the following plausible principle that any piece of evidence should satisfy in order 
to give adequate support to some proposition P: 
Independence: some piece of evidence E supports some proposition P only if someone 
who does not already believe P can gain justification to believe P on the basis of E. 
 
Think about any ordinary proposition you might believe, like the proposition that the coffee 
in the mug is hot. Let us call this proposition Coffee. Which pieces of evidence can support Coffee? 
Seemingly, those pieces of evidence that indicate that Coffee is true – for example, that the mug feels 
hot or that someone just poured freshly made coffee in the mug. However, these pieces of evidence 
 
14 Someone might claim that White’s argument only shows that some of our hinge-commitments cannot be supported by 
propositions about appearances. That is, White’s argument clearly applies at least to those hinge-commitments the 
negation of which imply the available evidence. That I am not a brain in a vat being fed exactly the experiences that I am 
in fact having is such a hinge-commitment, but the same might not be true of other hinge-commitments. But notice, that 
even if there is an argument that some of our other hinge-commitments can be supported by propositions about our 
appearances, dogmatists à la Weisberg are in a very bad position to begin with. We have seen that their view cannot 
support two of our most important hinge-commitments i.e., that we are not brains in vats being fed the experiences that 
we are in fact having and that our perception is reliable. Furthermore, given that Weisberg’s strategy bans certain 
argumentative moves present in the ‘Easy Knowledge Argument’ and that the same maneuvers must be banned in the 
‘External World Easy Knowledge Argument’, this gives us the result that we cannot be justified either in believing other 
hinge-commitments like that there are external objects that I am interacting with and that are the object of my 
perceptions. So, still, it seems to me that for someone who wants to show that we have justification for hinge-
propositions, this new version of dogmatism is not too attractive. 
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not only indicate that Coffee is more likely to be true than not, but also are such that someone who 
does not already believe Coffee could gain justification to believe Coffee on the basis of them. If I do 
not yet believe Coffee but I take the mug into my hands and feel its hotness, or if I see a friend 
pouring freshly made coffee in a mug, I thereby gain justification to believe Coffee on the basis of 
either of these pieces of evidence. 
In contrast, if we think of pieces of putative evidence that do not satisfy Independence, it 
seems that that these pieces of evidence cannot adequately support P. Think, for example, about the 
following proposition: ‘the Daily Tar Heel is a reliable newspaper’ (DTH). There might be many 
pieces of evidence that could give support to DTH: that the Daily Tar Heel has a good record of 
reporting accurate facts, that its journalists are honest and have no motives to lie, etc. However, 
what if our only piece of evidence is that the Daily Tar Heel itself printed that it is a reliable 
newspaper? If seems that, if we do not already believe DTH, this piece of evidence cannot help us 
to gain justification for DTH. This is because we would only take the statements of the Daily Tar 
Heel as true (and hence, as reliable evidence) if we already thought that it was a reliable newspaper. 
So if we did not already think that it was a reliable newspaper, we would not know whether to trust 
what the Daily Tar Heel says about its own reliability.  
Thus, the proposition that the Daily Tar Heel printed that it is a reliable newspaper does not 
satisfy Independence with respect to DTH. Thus, Independence predicts that it is not evidence for 
DTH. And it seems that this is the intuitively correct result: on its own, the mere fact that the Daily 
Tar Heel printed that it is a reliable newspaper is not good evidence that it is a reliable newspaper 
(that is, for DTH). To support DTH, we need some independent evidence that the Daily Tar Heel is 




Just as a piece of evidence must satisfy Independence in order to support ordinary empirical 
propositions, a piece of evidence has to satisfy this principle to support the hinge-propositions we 
hold. However, there is no piece of empirical evidence that can satisfy Independence and thereby 
give support to our hinge-propositions. To see this, let us focus for brevity on the hinge-proposition 
‘there is an external world’. What could be the evidence for this proposition? 
First, like G.E. Moore, you might think that the proposition that there are two hands in 
front of you is your evidence for the hinge-proposition that there is an external world. After all, that 
there are two hands in front of you, i.e., two ordinary objects of your perception, entails that there is 
an external world. But notice that, since a proposition is plausibly part of your evidence only if it is 
true, in claiming that the proposition that there are two hands in front of you is part of your 
evidence, we are already presupposing that there are actually ordinary objects of perception (such as 
hands) – i.e., that there is an external world. An agent who does not already believe that there is an 
external world cannot gain justification to believe this proposition on the basis of the proposition 
‘there are two hands in front of me’. This is because they do not yet believe that the proposition that 
there are two hands in front of them is true, and hence they do not yet believe that it is part of their 
evidence. (Instead, they would only take as part of their evidence other propositions like the 
proposition that it appears that there are two hands in front of them.) Therefore, by the 
Independence principle, ordinary empirical propositions like the proposition that there are two 
hands in front of me cannot support the proposition that there is an external world.  
Alternatively, you might think, as the dogmatist does, that the proposition that it appears that 
there are two hands in front of you is your evidence for the hinge-proposition that there is an 
external world. But if we want to avoid the easy knowledge objection that dogmatism faces, then we 
must say that this inference is only justified if we are also justified in believing some sort of reliability 
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claim that says that it is usually the case that when it appears to you that some physical object P is in 
front of you, P is in front of you. But notice that this reliability claim takes for granted that it is true 
that there is an external world, since it’s only if there is an external world that appearances are a 
reliable guide to reality. Thus, an agent who does not already believe that there is an external world 
cannot gain justification for this proposition based on the appearance that there are two hands in 
front of her. Thus, by Independence, ordinary propositions about appearances, such as the 
proposition that it appears that there are two hands in front of me, cannot support the proposition 
that there is an external world.  
Neither propositions about appearances nor ordinary empirical propositions are good pieces 
of evidence for ‘there is an external world’, because they fail to satisfy Independence. Plausibly, this 
generalizes to any other hinge-propositions underlying our empirical beliefs. And so, empirical 
evidence turns out not to be evidence that can justify our commitments in those propositions. 
There are other strategies for spelling out what type of justification we have for our hinge-
commitments that do not lead us to the same problems that dogmatism does and that in general do 
not depend on empirical evidence. These strategies argue that the justification we have for our 
hinge-commitments is not a posteriori but a priori. In the next section I develop two different ways to 
develop this aprioristic approach.  
3. Two prominent a priori strategies: Cohen’s and DeRose’s strategies 
If we assume that we must be, somehow, justified in holding our hinge-commitments and 
we deny that such justification is empirical, then the a priorist route is a natural way to explore. 
There are two prominent strategies for the claim that our hinge-commitments are justified a priori. 
One is put forward by Stewart Cohen (2010) and the other by Keith DeRose (2018). I will develop 
each, and then argue that these strategies are unsuccessful.  
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Cohen’s a priori approach 
Let us start with the strategy offered by Stewart Cohen (2010). Broadly speaking, Cohen 
argues that the successful use of some of our cognitive abilities can bring about a priori justification 
for our hinge-commitments. He argues that being a competent user of correct inferential rules 
(either deductive or defeasible inferential rules), along with being a competent user of a rule that he 
calls Suppositional Reasoning, confers a priori defeasible justification to believe the relevant 
conditionals that result from this reasoning. For Cohen, Suppositional Reasoning is a rule of 
reasoning similar to the reasoning involved with the use of the rule of Conditional Proof, but which 
can be used not only with deductive inference rules but also with defeasible inference rules. One 
uses Suppositional Reasoning as follows: one assumes a premise P, and if by using an inference rule 
one arrives at Q, then one is allowed to conclude that the conditional that ‘if P, then Q’ is true—just 
like using a conditional proof in a deductive system. Suppositional Reasoning, however, is different 
from Conditional Proof because, unlike the latter, the former gives us only defeasible justification for 
believing the relevant conditional.  
There are many inference rules that we can use along with Suppositional Reasoning. Let us 
consider one of them and, as an example of Cohen’s view, use it in an exercise of Suppositional 
Reasoning.   
  Consider the inferential rule Statistical Syllogism: 
      Statistical Syllogism: 
15. Most Fs are Gs 
16. A is F 
17. Therefore, A is G. 
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The general idea is that whenever we are warranted in using this rule in an exercise of 
Suppositional Reasoning, we also have defeasible justification to believe the conditional ‘if most Fs 
are Gs, and if A is F, then A is G’. Notice that the justification for believing this conditional is a 
priori because, regardless of whether we have empirical evidence for the particular propositions 
involved, we can engage in this reasoning a priori. Consider the following instantiation of the rule: 
18. Most cats are lazy 
19. Arya is a cat 
20. Therefore, Arya is lazy. 
According to Cohen, in virtue of our competence of inferring from (18) and (19), we have a 
priori justification to believe the conditional ‘if most cats are lazy, and Arya is a cat, then Arya is lazy’. 
(And this is so regardless of whether we have evidence for (18) or (19).) The idea is that regardless 
of whether we ever entertain the reasoning from 18-20, as long as we are capable of assuming 
premises like (18) and (19) and arriving at (20) via reasoning, we already have a priori propositional 
justification to believe the conditional that results from applying Suppositional Reasoning.  
Cohen argues that the same strategy with a different inference rule can be used to argue that we have 
a priori propositional justification for our hinge-commitments. Cohen thinks that “the proposition 
that something looks a certain way is a defeasible reason to believe that it is that way” (p.151) which 
in turn means that there must be a defeasible (or, not infallibly truth-preserving) inference rule from 
the former proposition to the latter. This defeasible inference rule allows us to infer from a 
proposition about our perceptions a proposition about a matter of fact. We have already introduced 
this rule in the previous section; we called it ‘Perceptual Inference Rule’.  
      Perceptual Inference Rule 
21. X looks C 
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22. Therefore, X is C 
According to Cohen, then, for us to have a priori justification for our hinge-commitments we 
need two conditions: 
i. The existence of the correct inference rule ‘Perceptual Inference Rule’ (PIR) 
ii. That the agent is a competent user of PIR and of Suppositional Reasoning 
When these two conditions are satisfied, we are a priori justified in believing the general 
conditional:  
PEC: ‘If X looks C, then X is C’.  
Because PEC entails that things are as they appear, and the truth of PEC is incompatible 
with the negation of some of the hinge-propositions we hold, if we were priori justified in believing 
PEC, we would also be priori justified in believing those hinge-propositions too. For example, we 
would be a priori justified in believing that our perception is reliable, and that we are not brains in a 
vat— which are programmed to have the same experiences as someone who is not a brain in a vat 
would have.  
Before advancing a problem that I think Cohen’s view has, I think it is illuminating to see 
how Cohen’s strategy can avoid the Easy Knowledge Problem that Dogmatism faces, despite both 
views appealing to the Perceptual Inference Rule. For the dogmatist, the agent can gain justification 
for the claim “my perceptual faculties are reliable” purely by repeatedly using those very same 
mechanisms – this makes the justification seem circular and thus objectionable. But according to 
Cohen’s strategy, we have a priori justification for the hinge-propositions we hold in virtue of us 
being competent users of the Perceptual Inference Rule and Suppositional Reasoning– so I have 
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justification for the hinge-propositions that “my perceptual faculties are reliable”, but not in virtue 
of using those very same faculties. My justification for that claim simply is a priori.  
A problem for Cohen’s view 
Cohen’s strategy is simple and elegant. As long as PIR is a correct inference rule (as it seems 
to be) and as long as we can competently use PIR with Suppositional Reasoning (as we seem to be 
capable of doing), we get a priori justification for our hinge-commitments. However, I am 
suspicious of Cohen’s strategy because I think that on the best way of understanding what makes an 
inference rule like PIR correct, an empirical component seems to be smuggled in, thereby rendering 
the justification we get by using PIR along with Suppositional Reasoning not purely a priori.  
To fully understand my worry, first, let us assume the plausible idea that whenever an 
inference rule is correct, it is correct in virtue of some truth-preserving features that it has. If that is 
true, then we have two options: either the correctness of a rule depends on its actually being truth-
preserving, or it depends on one’s being justified in believing that the rule is truth-preserving. In 
deductive systems, the rule will need to be necessarily truth-preserving (on the first view), or to be 
such that we are justified in believing it to be necessarily truth-preserving (on the second view). Of 
course, defeasible inference rules are not correct in deductive systems, because they do not always 
preserve truth; defeasible inference rules only preserve truth most of the time. However, outside 
deductive systems defeasible inference rules can be correct. These rules are correct only if they are 
truth-preserving most of the time (on the first view), or only if we are justified in believing them to be 
so (on the second).  
To assess which way of thinking about the correctness of a rule is right, it is useful to 
consider two worlds, w1 and w2. In w1 and w2 you undergo the same experiences, you have the same 
memories and intuitions, and in particular, it seems to you as if appearances provide a reliably guide 
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to reality15. However, w1 and w2 are different since in w1 it is true that appearances are a reliably guide 
to reality, but in w2 you are living in a simulation where this is not true (but you cannot know this). 
Even though it seems that you can only have empirical knowledge in w1, assuming the plausible claim 
that internalism about justification is true,16 then the justificatory status of a given belief is the same 
in w1 and w2 (since you are undergoing precisely the same experiences in both worlds). Although 
some philosophers dispute internalism (e.g., Williamson (2000; Ch.9), and Goldman (1979)), Cohen 
himself has criticized externalist theories on precisely the grounds that the justificatory status of our 
beliefs in w1 and w2  should be the same (see Cohen and Lehrer (1983) and Cohen (1984)). So, for 
the purpose of understanding Cohen’s view and its predictions, it is fair to assume that internalism is 
true. Now, suppose that the correctness of a rule depends on its actually being truth-preserving most 
of the time, rather than on one’s being justified in believing that the rule is truth-preserving most of 
the time. Then, PIR is correct in w1, but not in w2. After all, appearances are only actually a good 
guide to reality in w1, and not in w2. Thus, this view about the correctness of a rule is inconsistent 
with the internalist verdict that the justificatory status of our beliefs is the same in w1 and w2. It 
would give Cohen the bizarre result that we would have a priori justification for our hinge-
commitments in w1 but not in w2. More generally, it would give Cohen the bizarre result that 
whether one is a priori justified depends on what kind of world one is inhabiting. To hold that PIR is 
correct in w2, and thus to make the view consistent with internalism, it seems that we need to adopt 
 
15 One might think that it is always the case that it seems that appearances provide a reliable guide to reality, but this is not 
actually so. In some worlds, it does not seem that appearances are an actual guide to reality. This will be illustrated when I 
consider w3. 
 
16 Internalism about justification is a plausible view. According to internalism, the justification that an agent has for her 




the alternative view that the correctness of a rule depends on one’s being justified in believing that 
the rule is truth-preserving.  
Before examining this view, let us consider one other view about what might make an 
inference-rule correct. According to this view, the correctness of an inference rule cannot be further 
explained (in terms of truth-preservation or otherwise); it is just a brute fact that certain rules are 
correct in all worlds. According to this view, then, we can keep our internalist intuitions about 
justification because in both worlds, w1 and w2, PIR is a correct inference rule and in both worlds, 
you have a priori justification for your hinge-commitments. But this cannot be correct. To see this, 
consider another world w3, which is also a simulation, but in which it does not even seem as if 
appearances provide a reliably guide to reality: suppose, for example, that any time it appeared that 
there is a solid object in front of you, once you try to touch that object you cannot feel anything 
there. In this world, at least one of your senses (either vision or touch) is not a reliable guide to 
reality. So, in w3 it does not seem as though appearances in general are a clearly reliable guide to 
reality. In such a world, PIR would not be truth-preserving, nor would you be justified in believing 
that it is truth-preserving. But, if the correctness of PIR were just a brute fact, PIR is a correct 
inference rule in w1  and w2, but also in w3. That seems absurd. So, given these considerations, then, it 
seems that the best remaining way to understand the correctness of an inference rule is in terms of 
our having justification to believe that the rule is truth-preserving (at least most of the time).  
Now, notice that our justification for believing that a rule is truth-preserving might itself be 
either a priori or empirical. Moreover, it seems to me that whether using a rule that is correct (in the 
sense of our being justified in believing that it is truth-preserving) along with Suppositional 
Reasoning would give us a priori justification to believe the resulting conditional depends on what 
type of justification we can have to believe that the rule is truth-preserving. If the justification to 
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believe that a particular rule is truth-preserving is a priori, then the justification we would get from 
using that correct rule along with Suppositional Reasoning would be also a priori. But, if the 
justification to believe that a particular rule is truth-preserving is empirical, then it is difficult to see 
why the justification we get to believe the resulting conditional from using that rule along with 
Suppositional Reasoning would be purely a priori, and not also empirical. This is the point where I 
think Cohen’s strategy fails to deliver a priori justification for our hinge-commitments. Let me 
develop the point more precisely.  
In deductive systems, it is easy to see that the justification we have for believing that correct 
deductive rules are truth-preserving is a priori; we do not need to do any empirical investigation to 
conclude that this type of inference rule necessarily preserves truth. And similar things can be said of 
some (non-deductive) correct defeasible inference rules like Statistical Syllogism. We can see that 
Statistical Syllogism, a correct defeasible inference rule, is truth-preserving most of the time without 
any empirical investigation. If most members of a class (regardless of the class) have a feature, then 
trivially, in most cases it will be true of them that they will have that feature. Thus, without any 
empirical investigation we know that it is true that using Statistical Syllogism will preserve truth in 
most cases. That is, we are a priori justified in believing so.  
Is our justification to believe that the correct defeasible inference rule PIR is truth-preserving 
most of the time a priori in the same way? No. For us to justifiably believe that PIR is truth-
preserving most of the time, we need to engage in some empirical investigation. For, recall, if we 
lived in a world like w3 where most of the time things are not as they appear, we might very well not 
be justified in believing that PIR preserves truth most of the time. So, to be justified in believing that 
PIR is truth-preserving most of the time, we have to actually observe the world, at minimum, to 
check that it is a world where (unlike w3) appearances at least seem to provide a reliable guide to 
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reality. There is nothing in just the meaning of the terms or the nature of the concepts that are 
employed in this rule that allows us to see a priori that PIR preserves truth most of the time. But if 
the justification we have to believe that PIR is most of the time truth-preserving is empirical, that is, 
if the correctness of PIR depends on an empirical component, then it seems that using PIR and 
Statistical Syllogism cannot deliver pure a priori justification for the resulting conditional.  
Now I can fully summarize my worry: our hinge-commitment that our perception is reliable 
is one of the hinge-commitments that, according to Cohen, gets justified a priori by the use of PIR 
and Suppositional Reasoning. But if it is true that (1) the correctness of employing a rule depends on 
our being justified in believing that the rule is (at least most of the time) truth-preserving, and (2) 
that we need empirical justification to believe that PIR is most of the time truth-preserving, then it 
seems that even if PIR is a correct defeasible rule, the fact that we can only be empirically justified in 
believing that it is truth-preserving most of the time shows that PIR and Suppositional Reasoning 
together cannot yield a priori justification for the proposition that our perception is reliable, or any 
other hinge-proposition for that matter.  
Of course, Cohen could now concede that the justification we get for hinge-propositions is 
not a priori, but rather, empirical. But I have already argued in section 2 that coming to have 
justification for the hinge-propositions we hold empirically leads us to a violation of the 
Independence principle for justification.  
Keith DeRose’s a priori approach 
Now we can move on to the second a priori view about the justification of our hinge-
commitments, developed by Keith DeRose (2018). DeRose’s view is part of a more general 
contextualist view about knowledge attributions. According to De Rose, in some ordinary 
conversational contexts we count as having knowledge of our hinge-commitments because the 
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epistemic standards are low enough, but in other conversational contexts (philosophical/skeptical 
contexts) where the epistemic standards are high, we do not count as having knowledge of our 
hinge-commitments. Such a view still faces the following question, however: in virtue of what kind 
of justification do we count, at least in ordinary contexts, as having knowledge of our hinge-
commitments? According to DeRose, the justification that enables us to count as having knowledge 
of our hinge-commitments in ordinary contexts is a priori. More specifically, he thinks, our hinge-
commitments are epistemically justified (or, at least, count as being justified in ordinary contexts) in 
virtue of its seeming to us that they are true.17  
According to DeRose, we are more generally justified in believing a priori propositions – for 
example mathematical propositions – in virtue of the phenomenology we have when we entertain 
them. Similarly, DeRose thinks that we are epistemically justified in holding our hinge-commitments 
in virtue of the phenomenology we have when we entertain them. As an illustration, let us consider 
the phenomenology we have when considering the negation of our hinge-commitments and of 
mathematical truths. When we consider the negation of our hinge-commitments, like the 
commitment that we are not brains in vats, we find it bizarre. This phenomenology is, according to 
DeRose, identical (or very similar) to the one we would have if we were to entertain the idea that it is 
not the case that 2x5=10. This phenomenology is the result of an a priori mechanism that determines 
what seems true to us. Assuming we actually are not brains in vats, this mechanism provides an 
accurate guide to reality both at the actual world and in all the worlds closest to the actual ordinary 
one. This is enough for it to give us a priori justification and knowledge of our hinge-commitments, 
at least by the standards operative in ordinary contexts. [p.243] 
 
17 In what follows, I will omit that the relevant justification is the one we have in ordinary contexts.  
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A problem for DeRose’s view 
As we have seen, for DeRose, we have a priori justification for believing hinge-commitments 
in virtue of having a certain phenomenology of the hinge-commitments seeming true, a seeming-
true-phenomenology. But I do not think that having a seeming-true-phenomenology is enough to 
establish a priori justification. We have this type of seeming about propositions that we would not 
say we are a priori justified in believing, but rather a posteriori justified in believing. For example, I 
justifiably believe that I am a reliable counter; whenever I count how many things there are in a 
particular place or how many events of a type have happened at a particular time, I am usually 
correct. I am justified in believing that I am a reliable counter in virtue of the empirical evidence I 
have (I have used special devices that help me track the amount of stuff I have counted, I have 
contrasted my results with the results of other reliable counters and our results matched, etc.) 
However, it seems true to me that I am a reliable counter, and if I were to consider the negation of 
this proposition that would seem bizarre to me. If it was enough to have this phenomenology 
towards a proposition to count as having a priori justification for it, then, as long as I had this 
phenomenology, even if I hadn’t gathered any empirical evidence about my own reliability, I would 
count as having a priori justification for my belief that I am a reliable counter (at least by ordinary 
standards). But this is a counterintuitive claim, we normally do not think that we have any a priori 
justification to believe this proposition, rather we think that whether I am justified in believing that I 
am a reliable counter depends on empirical facts. In this case, the seeming-true-phenomenology by 
itself does not seem to be enough to establish that I am (either a priori or empirically) justified in 
believing that I am a reliable counter in the absence of other evidence about my reliability — rather, 
in this case, it is essential to my justification that I have empirically collected track-record data about 
my reliability in counting regardless of whether this belief also seems true to me.  
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In saying this, I do not mean to deny that we have this seeming-true-phenomenology when 
we entertain some propositions that we have a priori justification to believe—propositions like that 
squares have four sides or that 1+1=2—and that maybe in these cases the seeming-true-
phenomenology plays a role in our being a priori justified in believing such propositions. My point is 
that merely having this seeming-true-phenomenology cannot be by itself enough to show that I have 
a priori justification to believe the relevant proposition. If the seeming-true phenomenology were 
enough to show this, I would be a priori justified in believing any proposition that triggered the 
seeming-true-phenomenology including propositions like that I am a reliable counter. But we have 
seen that this is counterintuitive.  
DeRose might try to resist this argument and claim that the seeming-true-phenomenology 
only plays a substantive role in establishing a priori justification for propositions that we cannot get 
empirical evidence for. Obviously, mathematical propositions are of this kind, and we have reason to 
believe that our hinge-commitments are too (given the argument about Independence I advanced in 
section 2). So, a refined version of DeRose’s view would have two necessary conditions for a priori 
justification for some proposition: (i) we need to have the seeming-true-phenomenology towards the 
proposition, and (ii) the proposition must be such that we cannot have empirical evidence for it.  
The proposition that I am a reliable counter does not satisfy condition (ii)—I can get 
empirical evidence for it. So it is not surprising, DeRose might say, that even though we can have 
the seeming-true-phenomenology about this proposition, that is not enough for that proposition to 
be a priori justified. By contrast, consider the proposition ‘the number of stars is even’. Given the 
type of beings we are, and the type of technology we have, we cannot have empirical evidence for 
this proposition. Are we a priori justified in believing it? DeRose would say that we are not because 
in this case condition (ii) is satisfied, but not condition (i)—we do not have the relevant 
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phenomenology to be justified in believing it a priori. Though it is possible that someone might 
believe this proposition on a whim, it would be really strange if considering the negation of that 
proposition felt bizarre to that person. DeRose might claim then, that it is just in situations where 
both condition (i) and condition (ii) are satisfied that our phenomenology becomes relevant to having 
a priori justification for the relevant proposition. And so, because our hinge-commitments satisfy 
both conditions, we are a priori justified in believing them.  
However, this modified version of DeRose’s view still is not right. I think there could be 
cases where both conditions are satisfied, yet we would not want to concede that an agent has a 
priori justification to believe the relevant proposition. For example, consider a modified version of 
the counting case considered above. Suppose that someone is suffering from some sort of general 
amnesia involving loss of short-term memory. In this situation, it would be impossible for this 
person to marshal empirical evidence for the proposition that she is a reliable counter. Even though 
she might correctly count time after time, she will not be able to justifiably conclude that she is a 
reliable counter because she does not have an independent check on her reliability—condition (ii) is 
satisfied. However, it is plausible that when prompted to consider whether she is a reliable counter, 
she might feel like she is, and considering that she is not a reliable counter seems bizarre to her——
condition (i) is also satisfied. But, even if in this case both conditions are satisfied, we would not 
grant that this agent is a priori justified in believing that she is a reliable counter. She cannot possibly 
have the evidence she needs to be justified in believing this. So, even in cases where the agent 
cannot have empirical evidence for believing a proposition, it is not enough to have the relevant 
phenomenology to be a priori justified in believing such a proposition.   
Before concluding this section, I want to consider a final response that DeRose might make. 
He might point out that it could still be (in principle) possible that the seeming-true-phenomenology 
32 
 
confers a priori justification in some cases, like when the relevant proposition is a mathematical 
truth, though not in others (like the counting example). And so, DeRose might suggest, that it is (in 
principle) possible that our hinge-commitments are a priori justified in virtue of the relevant 
seeming-true-phenomenology. However, it is not clear what could support this intuition. Even if it 
was true that we are a priori justified in believing mathematical truths in virtue of having a seeming-
true-phenomenology, the case of hinge-commitments, which are (deeply) contingent propositions18, 
is much closer to the case of the counting example (where the relevant proposition is also (deeply) 
contingent) than to the case of the mathematical truths (where the relevant propositions are not 
contingent). So even if the seeming-true-phenomenology could give us a priori justification for our 
mathematical truths, it is difficult to see why it could also give us justification for our hinge-
commitments. 19  
With this, I conclude that, as they stand, both Cohen’s and DeRose’s strategies fail to show 
that our hinge-commitments are a priori justified. Of course, this does not mean that there cannot be 
any other way to defend that our hinge-commitments are justified a priori, but this result is 
significant. Cohen’s and DeRose’s accounts are very influential and showing that they fall short of 
their target is, at least, an indication that the a priori strategy is difficult to defend.  
 
18 Deeply contingent true propositions are propositions such that there is no semantic guarantee that some verifiable 
state of affairs for them actually exists (Hawthorne (2002); 247). These propositions contrast with so called superficially 
contingent proposition that many people, following Kripke, think we can have contingent a priori knowledge (e.g. “One 
meter is to be the length of S, where S is a certain stick in Paris [at t0]”. Kripke (1980; p. 54) This expresses a contingent 
truth that is known a priori at least by those who fixed the meter as the length of that stick at t0). There is a general 
intuition among philosophers that we cannot get a priori knowledge of deeply contingent propositions which I am 
presupposing in this paper. For a defense of this intuition see Yuval Avnur (2012). 
19 Alex Worsnip (2019) has developed a different criticism of DeRose’s strategy. Although he does not use the 
terminology of hinge-commitments, his point can be presented with it. Worsnip argues that unless we can have a priori 
seemings which actually track deeply contingent truths, these seemings would be equally predicted by the falsity of our 
hinge-commitment as by their truth. By a principle of evidential parity, this means that these seemings cannot constitute 
evidence for the relevant hinge-commitment, and so cannot support it.  
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4. Final Remarks 
Our hinge-commitments are presupposed by all our ordinary empirical-beliefs, but it is far 
from clear how we can be justified in holding them. Either we are a priori or empirically justified in 
holding them, but I have argued that there are important challenges for either way of thinking about 
the justification for the hinge-propositions we hold.  
Dogmatism—the view that the justification we have for the hinge-proposition we hold is 
empirical—is subject to the easy knowledge or bootstrapping criticism, as others have remarked. 
Additionally, I have offered a diagnosis of why there cannot be any successful strategy that argues 
that we have empirical justification for the hinge-propositions we hold; any putative piece of 
empirical evidence for our hinge-propositions fails to satisfy Independence—a condition that is 
required for a piece of evidence to support a proposition.   
I developed two versions of the a priorist strategy—the strategy arguing that the justification 
we have for the hinge-propositions we hold is a priori—namely, Cohen’s and DeRose’s strategy. I 
have advanced a different criticism for each. In the case of Cohen’s strategy, it seems that an 
empirical element is at the core of a mechanism that is supposedly responsible for producing a priori 
justification for the hinge-propositions we hold. In the case of DeRose’s strategy, it is not clear 
whether the condition it claims is sufficient for having a priori justification for hinge-propositions 
(namely, a certain phenomenology) by itself is really enough to have any justification.   
If there seems to be no available evidence that can adequately support the hinge-
propositions we hold, then it seems that we have to conclude that we lack justification for them. But 
if we lack justification for them, then it may seem that they must be unjustified. And this threatens to 
render unjustified all our other empirical beliefs which presuppose them. This skepticism, however, 
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rests on the assumption that if we lack a justification for a proposition, then we are unjustified in 
believing it.20 Can we reject this assumption? 
Hinge-Epistemologists aim to do just that. Hinge-epistemologists claim that hinge-
commitments are not irrational or unjustified even though they are not supported by the evidence. 
In the next chapter, I want to consider these strategies in more depth. In particular, I want to 





















20 There is another skeptical worry: If we are not positively justified in believing hinge-propositions, then by closure 
principles we are not justified in believing ordinary empirical propositions. I will address this worry in the conclusions of 




CHAPTER 2. HINGE-COMMITMENTS AS ARATIONAL BELIEFS 
 
1. Hinge-epistemology 
It is widely thought that one cannot justifiably or rationally21 believe a proposition that is not 
at all supported by one’s evidence.  Consider the following case. Faithful is not cheating on her 
partner Suspicious, and more importantly, there is nothing in Faithful's behavior that remotely 
indicates that she is cheating on Suspicious. If Suspicious were to believe, based on Faithful’s 
behavior, that Faithful is unfaithful to her, Suspicious’s belief would be unjustified, or irrational. 
When thinking about most of our ordinary empirical beliefs, this evidentialist requirement on 
justification, or rationality, gives the right result. 
However, it seems that this evidentialist requirement on justification leads to some problems 
once we consider certain assumptions implicit in our most general belief-forming practices. For any 
empirical belief we hold, e.g., the belief that there is a computer in front of me, we assume other 
more basic propositions, like the proposition that there is an external world, and that our empirical 
evidence gives us some indication as to how that world is. Let us call the propositional content of 
these assumptions hinge-propositions; and our assumptions concerning the truth of these 
propositions hinge-commitments.  
Hinge-commitments are special not only in that they pervasively underlie all of our empirical 
beliefs, but also in that it is hard to see how they can be supported by our evidence—unlike our 
 
21 Following the common practice, when there is no indication of the contrary, the term ‘rational belief’ is 
interchangeable with the term ‘justified ‘belief’.  
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common empirical beliefs. Let me explain why some find this way of thinking about hinge-
commitments attractive. Given that the hinge-commitments presupposed by any of our ordinary 
empirical beliefs are about contingent features of the external world, and of our relation to it, it is 
plausible that any evidence that could serve as support for them has to be empirical.22 However, it is 
unclear what kind of empirical evidence could support hinge-commitments. Plausibly, any piece of 
evidence E supports the proposition P, only if someone who does not already believe P can gain 
justification to believe P on the basis of E. But for any piece of ordinary empirical evidence that we 
can think of as a potential candidate for supporting any of the hinge-propositions we believe, that 
piece of evidence cannot help an agent who does not already believe the relevant hinge-proposition 
to gain justification for it on its basis. Therefore, empirical evidence cannot support our hinge-
propositions, and so cannot render our hinge-commitments justified, or rational.   
As an illustration of this conclusion, consider the following two examples regarding the 
hinge-commitment that there is an external world. Like G.E. Moore, you might think that your 
evidence that there is a computer in front of you is also evidence that there is an external world. 
After all, that there is a computer in front you –i.e., an ordinary, physical object of your perception— 
entails that there is an external world. However, this piece of evidence presupposes that what I’m 
seeing really is a computer, and thereby presupposes that there actually are ordinary objects of 
perception. An agent who does not already believe that there is an external world arguably cannot 
 
22 There are some people who, following Saul Kripke’s claim that it is possible to have a priori contingent knowledge, 
deny that just because a proposition is contingent its justification has to be empirical or a posteriori. For one development 
of this view see Williamson [1986]. For further discussion of this attempt see Hawthorne [2002] and Leech [2010]. There 
have been some attempts to argue that hinge-commitments are instances of contingent a priori knowledge. For a defense 
of this view see Cohen [2010] and DeRose [2018]. For a critical review of this view, see Worsnip [2019]. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, I will take for granted the intuitive assumption that the justification for the hinge-




gain justification for it on the basis of this piece of evidence. Therefore, this piece of empirical 
evidence cannot support that there is an external world.  
Alternatively, you might think that the proposition that it appears that there is a computer in 
front of you is a better candidate to count as evidence for this hinge-proposition. However, the 
evidential force of propositions about appearances seems to come from something like the 
following Reliability Claim: 
It is usually the case that when it appears to you that there is a computer in front of you (or 
some physical object P is in front of you), there is a computer in front of you (or whatever 
physical object P is).  
But the evidential support the Reliability Claim can offer to the hinge-commitment in 
question appears to hold only if ‘there is an external world’ is true; the Reliability Claim literally takes 
for granted that it is true that there is an external world and it gives us a recipe to reliably determine 
when we are in contact with such a world. And it is easy to see that no agent who does not already 
believe that there is an external world can gain justification for this proposition on the basis of the 
Reliability Claim.  Thus, propositions about appearances do no better than ordinary empirical 
propositions as pieces of evidence for our hinge-commitment that there is an external world. 
Arguably, this generalizes to any other hinge-commitment underlying our empirical beliefs. And so, 
empirical evidence turns out not to provide independent support for our hinge-commitments, and 
so turns out not to be evidence that can justify those commitments. 23 
 
23 There are two other influential approaches which might try to challenge this: dogmatists and coherentists. For 
different versions of dogmatism see Feldman and Conee [2004], Markosian [2014] and Pryor [2000]. For different 
criticisms of these views see White [2006] and Worsnip [2019]. For a development of coherentism see Bonjour [1985]. 
For criticisms see Bonjour [1999]. For the purposes of this paper, I will take for granted that hinge-commitments can’t 
be supported by our evidence, as this is also assumed by hinge-epistemologists. 
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Hinge-commitments present an interesting challenge to the aforementioned conception of 
justified belief. It seems natural to think of our hinge-commitments as beliefs which are rational or 
justified— after all, they seem to guide our behaviors the same way beliefs do and our 
paradigmatically rational endeavors, like scientific research, presuppose that they are true. However, 
if justified beliefs are only those that are supported by the agent’s evidence, and if the reasoning 
above shows that hinge propositions cannot be supported by the agent’s evidence, then it follows 
that our hinge-commitments are not rational. We have a puzzle. We have four propositions that all 
seem intuitively true but which cannot be all true under penalty of inconsistency: (a) rational beliefs 
must be supported by the evidence; (b) hinge-commitments are beliefs (c) hinge-commitments are 
not supported by the evidence; and (d) hinge-commitments are rational. Which of them should we 
drop? 
Hinge-epistemology is a family of philosophical views which attempt to solve this puzzle 
without denying (c). We can classify different developments of hinge-epistemology into two initial 
groups according to the rational status they give to hinge-commitments: the Broad Rationality 
Group (BRG) and the Narrow Rationality Group (NRG). Those within the BRG argue that we have 
some sort of rational warrant for hinge-commitments in the absence of evidence; they thus deny (a) 
or (b). Those within the NRG claim that hinge-commitments are not subject to rational evaluation; 
thus they deny (d), but not by saying that hinge-commitments are irrational, but rather by holding 
that they are arational.24 Both the views within the BRG and those within the NRG can be further 
classified along a second, orthogonal dimension concerning what kind of mental states hinge-
commitments are – more specifically, whether they are beliefs, or some other mental state.  
 




In the current literature, Annalisa Coliva and Crispin Wright have developed the two most 
prominent BRG views, and Duncan Pritchard has done the same for a NRG view. Each of these 
views takes it that hinge-commitments are not beliefs but rather a different belief-like mental states, 
thus denying (b) in our puzzle.  
The following table shows how each of these views (and my own), fit within the two 
classificatory dimensions I just mentioned: 
Table 1: Different Hinge-Epistemology Views  
ATTITUDE TYPE RATIONAL STATUS  
 Rational (the BRG) Arational (the NRG) 
Belief  My view 
Not belief Coliva’s view 
Wright’s view 
Pritchard ‘s view 
 
My main goal in this paper is to motivate and defend a new NRG view: The Arational 
Beliefs view. According to this view, hinge-commitments have three essential features: (i) they are 
beliefs; (ii) they are arational; and (iii) they are enablers of epistemic rationality. This new view will 
avoid all of the objections that I develop below to Coliva’s and Wright’s BRG views, as well as the 
objections I develop to Pritchard’s NRG view, but it will capture all of the insights that animate each 
of those three views. Within the BRG camp, I will argue that any view which defends the claim that 
we are required to hold a particular hinge-commitment in any circumstance, like Coliva’s does, leads 
to the conclusion that rationality requires contradictory things from us, and so we should reject it. I 
will also argue that all BRG views, including Coliva’s and Wright’s, are subject to a significant 
criticism given their commitment to the claim that holding hinge-commitments is rational. This 
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result suggests that the best way of understanding the rational status of hinge-commitments is as the 
NRG does; they are arational. The main NRG view in the literature is Pritchard’s. While I agree with 
Pritchard that hinge-commitments are arational, I will argue that Pritchard’s view also fails on 
account of its claim that hinge-commitments are not beliefs. 
2. The Rational Status of Hinge-commitments 
2.1 The Broad Rationality Group (BRG)  
What I call the Broad Rationality Group (BRG) is a set of views that are committed to the 
claim that we can have non-evidential warrants to hold hinge-commitments. Two popular ways in 
which a BRG view can be developed are advanced by Annalisa Coliva in her ‘Extended Rationality’ 
view, and by Crispin Wright in his ‘Epistemic Entitlement’ view. Broadly speaking, both ways of 
developing BRG views are committed to the claim that we have rational warrant to hold those 
hinge-commitments that are conditions of possibility of practices constitutive of epistemic 
rationality, and so of epistemic rationality itself. Developments like Coliva’s are additionally 
committed to the following claim: 
There is one particular hinge-commitment (for Coliva, the proposition that there is an 
external world) that we are rationally required to hold in any circumstance.  
 
In contrast, developments like Wright’s reject this claim and instead hold that: 
We are entitled to hold particular hinge-commitments only in the absence of defeaters. 
I will argue that either way of developing a BRG view is defective. The ‘Extended 
Rationality’ view leads to the result that we are sometimes subject to competing requirements that 
are impossible to satisfy at the same time in a rational way. And both types of views fall short of 
proving that the fact that some hinge-commitment is a condition of the possibility of epistemic 
rationality entails that it is itself rationally required. 
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If my criticisms are right, this suggests that the best way of thinking about the rational status 
of hinge-commitments is the way the Narrow Rationality Group (NRG) does: hinge-commitments 
are arational. 
2.1.1 Annalisa Coliva’s ‘Extended Rationality’ view 
Coliva [2015], [2019] claims that hinge-commitments are not beliefs, but assumptions. 
According to Coliva, there is a normative difference between assumptions and beliefs: some 
assumptions ought to be held in the absence of any evidence and so, even in a rational agent, they 
fail to be responsive to the agent’s evidence in the way that beliefs must be. So, she concludes, 
assumptions cannot be beliefs. Assumptions will be in almost every other respect just like beliefs. 
When an agent is entertaining any of her assumptions, she does not need to see herself as having 
mental states that are different from beliefs. Moreover, assumptions guide the agent’s behavior just 
like beliefs do. Given that assumptions are not beliefs, however, they can be justified in non-
evidential ways. Coliva’s view thus gives up the claim (b) of our puzzle – that hinge-commitments 
are beliefs. By doing so, she can hold, without inconsistency, the remaining three claims that 
constitute our puzzle. For the time being, let us grant Coliva’s claim about the attitude-type of hinge-
commitments and focus on her view about their rational status.  
For Coliva, assumptions play an important role in our epistemic practices. She claims that 
some assumptions, like the assumption ‘there is an external world’, are constitutive ingredients of 
the practice of acquiring perceptual justification – i.e., of rationally assessing, forming, suspending 
and giving up empirical beliefs on the basis of perceptual evidence. Let me further explain her claim. 
According to moderatism, a view about the nature of perceptual warrants advanced and defended by 
Coliva [2015], perceptual justification for any ordinary contingent belief that P is constituted both by 
some experience (with P as a content), and the assumption that there is an external world. Coliva 
42 
 
thinks that moderatism describes the only way in which we can justifiably engage in rational 
deliberation; i.e., it is only by assuming that there is an external world that we can use subjective 
experience to provide evidential support for beliefs about mind-independent objects.  
The practice of acquiring perceptual justification is essential to our notion of epistemic 
rationality. For Coliva, the assumption that there is an external world is a constitutive ingredient of 
this practice, which thereby makes it also a constitutive part of epistemic rationality [2015, p.128]. 
Furthermore, according to Coliva, that this assumption is constitutive of epistemic rationality 
suggests that it is a condition of the possibility of epistemic rationality: without such an assumption, 
there would be no epistemic rationality whatsoever. Given that this assumption is such a condition 
of possibility, Coliva claims, it is itself required by rationality. The claim that rationality can require 
us not only to manage our beliefs on the basis of evidence but also to assume those propositions 
which are constitutive of epistemic rationality itself is the key ingredient in Coliva’s Extended 
Rationality view.  
A problem for Coliva’s view 
Coliva’s Extended Rationality view is a promising view about the nature of hinge-
commitments.  In what follows, however, I will provide an argument to show that being rationally 
required to hold a particular hinge-proposition in every circumstance can lead to rational 
requirements that are impossible to rationally satisfy at the same time.  
The flashing signpost scenario 
Flashing signposts mysteriously appear overnight in every town and city in the world. These 
signposts have the following message in different languages: there is no external world, you are in a 
simulation. The first reaction of people is confusion; who would invest so much money and time 
putting up these messages? But then things become weirder: things start appearing and disappearing 
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in front of everyone’s eyes as a sign that the message in the signpost is true. In this scenario, you 
rationally form the belief that there is no external world (as you ordinarily conceive of it) and that all 
this time you have been living in a simulation. You have evidence that sufficiently supports this 
proposition and you base your belief on this evidence.  
Although things are not as they used to be, you realize that there are some new regularities 
that allow you to move around and predict what will happen. For example, you might notice that 
before any new signpost is displayed or before something disappears in front of your eyes, you feel a 
sense of déjà vu.25 You reason about this and form the hypothesis that whenever the simulation is 
manipulated to directly communicate with the simulated people, they experience a sense of déjà vu. 
At this point, you have changed the way you think about your evidence – from thinking that it 
reports reliable information about mind-independent objects (the content of your experiences), to 
thinking that it sometimes reliably indicates direct attempts of communication from outside the 
simulation to inside the simulation. Just as you have discovered this feature of the simulation, you 
hope to discover new patterns that will allow you to successfully navigate the simulation.   
The flashing signpost scenario is logically possible, but it is also a scenario where epistemic 
agents would rationally take the possibility of being in a simulation as one that is reasonably likely to 
be the case; in other words, it is a scenario in which an agent’s evidence would adequately support 
her belief that she is in a simulation and that there is no external world—that is, there is no external 
 
25 The development of this example is inspired by two fictional cases where the agent’s evidence does not support the 
proposition ‘there is an external world’ as they usually interpreted it, but in which there are some other regularities that 
can help them navigate the world.  (i) In the movie The Matrix, Neo has a sense of déjà vu when seeing a black cat 
passing by. After saying “déjà vu”, Trinity reveals to him that a déjà vu is usually a glitch in the matrix which indicates 
that someone has changed something within the matrix. (ii)  In the first season of the TV show Russian Doll, Nadia 
Volvokov finds herself dying and reliving her 36th birthday party in an ongoing time loop where she finds herself dying 
and coming to live again back at her birthday party. [Spoiler alert!] Eventually, she finds some patterns in this unknown 




world in the sense that we usually conceive it, as the claim that there are ordinary objects, which are 
the objects of my perceptions, and which obey natural laws of physics.  
Now, according to a widely accepted principle of epistemic rationality that Coliva adopts – 
let us call it Evidential Rationality – believers are rationally required to manage their beliefs on the 
basis of their evidence [2015: 128]. According to a plausible interpretation of this principle, we 
should believe that P, disbelieve that P (i.e., believe that not-P), or suspend judgement about P, 
according to what our evidence dictates. Evidential Rationality is the underlying principle of the 
claim (a) in our puzzle above. In the flashing signpost case, given our experiences and inferences, 
what we would be rationally required to do is disbelieve that there is an external world (at least in the 
way we used to think about it).  
According to the Extended Rationality view, in all situations, we are rationally required to 
assume that there is an external world (i.e., a world with ordinary objects of experience which obey 
the natural laws of physics). But this seems to entail that, in the flashing signpost scenario, we are 
rationally required both to believe that there is not an external world and to assume that there is an 
external world. But it seems impossible to rationally satisfy these requirements together. We know 
that, for Coliva, assumptions are in most respects just like beliefs; that phenomenologically 
assumptions and beliefs are one and the same thing. So it seems irrational to both assume that there 
is an external world and also disbelieve that there is an external world. Let me present this challenge 
for Coliva’s view in a schematic way: 
A new problem for the Extended Rationality view 
1. The flashing signpost scenario is logically possible.  




3. In this scenario, as in any scenario, the epistemic agent would be rationally required to 
assume that there is an external world (from Extended Rationality). 
4. In this scenario, the epistemic agent would be rationally required to believe that there is no 
external world (from 2 & Evidential Rationality). 
Therefore, 
5. There is a logically possible scenario in which the epistemic agent is rationally required to 
both believe that the external world does not exist and assume that the external world does exist. 
(from 1, 3 & 4) 
6. But, it is irrational to believe p while assuming not-p. 
Therefore, 
7. At least in some scenarios, epistemic rationality can require us to satisfy two things that are 
impossible to rationally satisfy at the same time. (from 5 & 6) 
Coliva’s view – i.e., the conjunction of Evidential Rationality and Extended Rationality – plus 
other plausible assumptions – i.e., (1), (2) and (6) – thus lead to (7). But (7) is a difficult bullet to bite. 
Furthermore, the flashing signpost scenario challenges Coliva’s claim that if we did not assume the 
hinge-proposition there is an external world, the practice of acquiring perceptual justification would be 
impossible, and therefore there would not be any such thing as epistemic rationality. In this scenario, 
it seems that even if we do not assume such a proposition, we can still form perceptually justified 
beliefs such as the belief that there is no external world and, based on our sense of déjà vu, beliefs 
about structural features of the simulation. Given these results, I am inclined to conclude that not 
only the extended rationality view, but also Coliva’s claim that without assuming that there is an 




Coliva might try resisting my argument in a number of places. First, she might claim that 
once the Extended Rationality view is properly stated, (3) does not follow from it. She might suggest 
that, on the best version of the Extended Rationality view, we are rationally required to assume that 
there is an external world only in the absence of defeaters.26 The flashing signpost scenario presents 
a clear defeater to the epistemic agent, so perhaps she is not rationally required to assume that there 
is an external world. As intuitive as this response might be, it is not available to Coliva. On her 
Extended Rationality view, it must be the case that wherever there are rational agents forming justified 
empirical beliefs, they must assume that there is an external world. If this were not true, then this 
assumption would not really be constitutive of the very practice of epistemic rationality, and thus 
would not (given Coliva’s view) be rationally required. Thus, Coliva cannot reject (3).  
Alternatively, Coliva might want to reject (4). She might argue that there is no scenario 
where we are rationally required to believe that there is no external world. Recall that, for Coliva, we 
are rationally required to assume that there is an external world because without this assumption we 
couldn’t engage in rational deliberation. The rationale behind rejecting (4), then would be that 
believing that there is no external world is in direct conflict with assuming that there is an external 
world, and thereby with the possibility of engaging in practices of rational deliberation. Since (4) 
follows from (2) and Evidential Rationality, Coliva can reject (4) only by rejecting or at least 
modifying one of them. It is difficult to see how she can reject (2): in this scenario the agent’s 
evidence seems clearly to support believing that there is no external world. That leaves her with 
rejecting or modifying Evidential Rationality. Indeed, at one point, Coliva seems only to commit to a 
narrower version of Evidential Rationality: “…the basic epistemic practice of gathering evidential 
 
26 Coliva’s view about justification of ordinary empirical beliefs includes such a clause. So she might extend this to hinge-
commitments as well.  
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warrants for ordinary empirical propositions […] is itself constitutive of epistemic rationality. Such a 
practice, I take it, is at the core of all human life given the kind of creatures we are” [2015: 128]27. I 
said that this is a narrower version of Evidential Rationality because it only applies to ordinary 
empirical propositions and, arguably, the hinge-proposition ‘there is an external world’ is not one of 
them. Coliva might claim that with this not-fully-general version of the principle in play, agents are 
never rationally required to believe that there is no external world, and so, her view is not subject to 
the objection from flashing signpost scenarios. 
Now, notice that the rationale behind rejecting (4) by accepting the narrow version of 
Evidential Rationality is that only with this version of the principle can we engage in practices of 
rational deliberation. However, it does not seem that keeping Evidential Rationality in its full 
generality would prevent us from engaging in these practices in cases like the flashing signpost. The 
scenario is far-fetched because of the situation it depicts, but just as we do in normal circumstances, 
in this scenario we are still deliberating what to believe on the basis of our evidence. What is 
different is that in this scenario we have sufficient evidence to believe that our observations are not 
the result of us perceiving the external world through our senses. If this is true, Coliva has no good 
rationale for abandoning Evidential Rationality in its full generality. And then, she cannot reject (4).  
Coliva could try to reject (6). She might claim that since one requirement talks about what 
we should believe and the other talks about what we should assume, these requirements are not 
contradictory and so it is not irrational to be required to hold both a belief that p and an assumption 
that not-p. This response fails because it overlooks that there are forms of incoherence that amount 
to irrationality besides holding strictly contradictory beliefs. An agent who believes that p and 
simultaneously assumes that not-p seems incoherent and, therefore irrational. So this response is not 
 




persuasive. Finally, Coliva might bite the bullet and accept that (7) is a consequence of her view. 
However, accepting that in some cases rationality could require us to be irrational is a difficult bullet 
to bite. 
In this section, I have offered an argument against BRG views which, like Coliva’s, are 
committed to the claim that a particular hinge-commitment is required by rationality in all 
circumstances. In what follows, I will examine Wright’s view which is not subject to the same 
criticism. However, I will raise a worry that affects either way of developing a BRG view.  
2.1.2 Crispin Wright’s ‘Entitlement’ View 
A second way to develop BRG views is exemplified by Crispin Wright’s [2004]. He claims 
that it is possible that we have some rational non-evidential epistemic warrants to hold hinge-
propositions; warrants to trust that these propositions are true.28 He calls these non-evidential 
warrants entitlements. Just like Coliva’s, Wright’s strategy for solving our initial puzzle is to give up 
claim (b)—the claim that hinge-commitments are beliefs. For him, rational beliefs must be 
supported by the evidence, and hinge-commitments are not so supported, yet if his view is right, 
holding hinge-commitments could still be rational.  
On Wright’s view, we can be entitled to hold some hinge-commitments (understood as 
states of trust) in the absence of evidence for the truth of the proposition in question. But holding a 
hinge-commitment in the absence of evidence must not be arbitrary. There have to be explanations 
of why we are entitled to hold them, and there are different stories of how this could go. Although 
Wright recognizes that there might not be a good story for every possible entitlement we seem to 
 
28 Wright concedes that we cannot be entitled to believe hinge-propositions because beliefs are the kind of mental states 
that can only be warranted via evidential considerations. So, he proposes that in these cases we are entitled to trust that a 
hinge-proposition is true. 
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have,29 he develops three plausible ways that we are entitled to trust some hinge-commitments – 
strategic entitlement, entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of rational deliberation. For 
the purposes of this paper, I will only focus on entitlement of rational deliberation.30 This 
entitlement promises to explain why it is rational for us to hold hinge-commitments in a way that is 
not subject to the criticisms that affected Coliva’s view.  I will argue that although this view is not 
subject to flashing signpost counterexamples, it, along with views like Coliva’s, falls short in showing 
that being entitled to hold some hinge-commitments is a consequence of the fact that they are 
conditions of possibility of epistemic deliberation.  
Entitlements of Rational Deliberation 
Entitlements of rational deliberation depend upon the constitutive elements of rational 
deliberation. We are rational beings that cannot opt out of rational agency. We are, so to speak, 
bound to engage in rational deliberation about what to do and what to believe.31 But for rational 
decision-making to be possible, Wright claims, there must be some hinge-commitments that we do 
not have any evidence against and whose truth we need to trust. Notice that the claim is not that 
there is a particular hinge-commitments that epistemic agents need to have in all circumstances, as 
Coliva claimed. Rather the claim Wright is committed to is that: 
 
29 In particular, he worries that there is no good story about whether we have entitlements to trust hinge-propositions 
about the existence of substances.  
 
30 The other two entitlements have been already criticized because at most they can provide us with pragmatic 
entitlements but not epistemic ones. See for different developments of this criticism Pritchard [2005], Jenkins [2007], 
and Moretti [2020]. 
 
31 Wright explicitly limits the scope of this entitlement to the domain of rational action. However, broadening its scope 
to include not only decisions about what to do but also about what to believe is not only natural—everything that holds 
good for the entitlement of rational action holds good for an entitlement of epistemic rationality—but it makes the 
entitlement of rational deliberation stronger. By ‘stronger’ I mean that the standard criticism against Wright’s other 
entitlements that they are not epistemic but pragmatic does not obviously apply to it.  
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It is constitutive of epistemic rationality that epistemic agents hold a particular hinge-
commitment as long as they have no reason to doubt it. 
For Wright, a hinge-commitment to P counts as an entitlement of rational deliberation if it 
satisfies the following two conditions: 
a) We do not have sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue. 
b) P is a hinge-commitment that cannot be evidentially supported but which is needed for 
effective rational deliberation.  
By using the adjective ‘effective’ when talking about rational deliberation, I think, Wright is 
trying to emphasize that in our current circumstances, only some hinges count as necessary conditions 
for engaging in the practice that best allows us, justifiably and correctly, to reach decisions in both 
the practical and the epistemic domain. He thereby recognizes that even if it is possible to come up 
with different ways in which doxastic deliberation might take place in different worlds, we are still 
entitled to hold the hinge-commitments we hold in our current circumstance even if they would not 
be as effective in those worlds. Let us say, given the types of being we are and our actual 
circumstances, we are entitled to the hinge-commitments that are necessary for our current rational 
practices of deliberation. 
Let me give you an example of an entitlement of rational deliberation. When deciding what 
course of action is best among different available possibilities, rational agents have to justifiably 
believe numerous subjunctive conditionals that state what would happen were such-and-such an 
action to take place. But the way rational agents can have justified beliefs about these conditionals is 
by trusting in generalizations that tell them that whenever they do such-and-such, they (usually) get a 
particular result, and so on. The moral of the story is that rational deliberation is only possible when 
agents believe that certain relevant empirical generalizations hold. The thesis of the Uniformity of 
Nature, which says that nature displays sufficiently many nomic regularities, is the thesis that, to our 
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knowledge, best allows us to form beliefs about the relevant generalizations, thereby allowing us to 
justifiably believe many subjunctive conditionals in our context. Furthermore, we have no reason to 
believe that the thesis of the Uniformity of Nature is false. Therefore, the thesis of the Uniformity of 
Nature is an entitlement of rational deliberation.  
On Wright’s view, then, we have entitlements of rational deliberation in virtue of being rational 
beings who can engage in rational deliberation. This view about the rational status of hinge-
commitments does better than Coliva’s because condition (a) — which states that we do not have 
sufficient reason to believe that P is untrue — shields it from counterexamples like the flashing 
signpost scenario. Coliva’s view is subject to this counterexample because she is committed to the 
claim that holding the hinge-proposition ‘there is an external world’ in all possible scenarios is a 
necessary condition of rational deliberation. In those scenarios in which we find counter-evidence 
against that particular hinge-proposition, Coliva has to bite the bullet and accept that rationality can 
require us to satisfy requirements that are impossible to rationally satisfy at the same time. But 
Wright does not have to accept this counterintuitive consequence. In the flashing signpost scenario 
Wright can just say that we have reasons to think that the proposition there is an external world is false, 
and so that we are not warranted in holding this proposition as a hinge-commitment. In this 
scenario, we are not entitled to trust that there is an external world is true because condition (a) is 
not satisfied. However, it seems plausible that even in a scenario like the flashing signpost scenario 
we hold other hinge-commitments which are not subject to doubt —i.e., we still trust that the world, 
whatever its ontology, behaves in regular ways. Wright’s entitlement of rational deliberation is better 
off than Coliva’s Extended Rationality view.  
Regardless of how well this view does against flashing signpost counterexamples, it raises a 
worry regarding the claim that we stand in a normative relation with our hinge-commitments 
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because they are necessary for our practices of epistemic rationality to take place. In fact, this worry 
is present in any BRG view which, like Coliva’s and Wright’s, is committed to this explanation of the 
rational status of hinge-commitments.  
The worry is this: if we stand in a normative relation to some of our hinge-commitments, i.e., if 
we are required or entitled to hold them, it is not in virtue of these hinge-commitments being 
necessary prerequisites or enablers of any practice of epistemic rationality, like rational deliberation. 
There are other enablers of this practice, but we are not inclined to think that we are entitled or 
required to have them because of this. Think, for example, about neocortices. The neocortex is the 
part of the mammalian brain that is necessary for higher-order brain functions such as rational 
deliberation. In other words, the neocortex is an enabler of rational deliberation. It is true that 
without the neocortex there would not be rational deliberation, but this truth seems not to bear on 
the rational status of having a neocortex. The same applies to our hinge-commitments.  
Wright could respond to my criticism by pointing out an obvious difference between hinge-
commitments and neocortices. Neocortices seem to be the kind of things that by their very nature 
can’t be subject to rational evaluation. That is why it does not make sense to say that we stand in a 
normative relation to neocortices, because we can only stand in this type of relation with things that 
are subject to rational evaluation. In contrast, attitudinal mental states, like beliefs or assumptions, 
are the kinds of things that by their very nature can be subject to rational evaluation. They are the 
kind of attitudinal mental states that are responsive to evidence and inferentially promiscuous, and 
those features seem to be present in attitudes that we consider rationally evaluable and which we can 
stand in normative relations with. Therefore, he might claim, it makes sense to claim that we stand 
in a normative relation to hinge-commitments.  
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Wright might propose, then, that X’s being an enabler or a necessary condition for rational 
deliberation in addition to X’s being rationally evaluable is sufficient for our being entitled or 
required to have X. Hinge-commitments satisfy these sufficient conditions, so we are entitled or 
required to have them. But it is difficult to see how an argument for this might go. After all, that 
hinge-commitments are necessary conditions for epistemic rationality is not itself a reason for us to 
trust that hinge-propositions are true even if we grant that hinge-commitments are states that can be 
rationally evaluable. A reason to trust a hinge-commitment would show up in deliberation about 
whether to trust it, but hinge-commitments are such that without them we could not deliberate 
about whether to trust them (or for that matter about anything else). Rather, it may be that holding 
hinge-commitments is just a psychological feature of epistemic agents like us.  
In this section I have developed a way in which a BRG view can avoid flashing signpost 
counterexamples. However, I have shown that even in this improved version, this development of a 
BRG view needs a positive argument for the claim that we are in an epistemic normative relation 
with our hinge-commitments. I have also shown that it is not easy to see how one can argue for 
such a claim. This result suggests that the best way to think about the rational status of hinge-
commitments is in a completely different fashion; i.e., as mental states that are arational.  
2.2 The Narrow Rationality Group (NRG) 
The Narrow Rationality Group (NRG) is a set of views that claim that hinge-commitments, 
regardless of what mental state they are, are not subject to rational evaluation. This feature makes 
any view within this group incompatible with any view within the Broad Rationality Group, since the 
BRG views are committed to the claim that we have rational warrant to hold hinge-commitments 
without evidence. By contrast, NRG views are committed with the claim that epistemic warrants can 
only obtain via evidential justification.  
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Duncan Pritchard [2018] has defended a popular NRG view. Like Coliva, Pritchard argues 
that hinge-commitments are necessary for there to be such a thing as epistemic rationality; that is, 
that they are enablers of the practice of epistemic rational evaluation. As such, he thinks, hinge-
commitments are not themselves subject to rational evaluation: they are neither rational nor 
irrational. This consideration makes him postulate that hinge-commitments cannot be beliefs [2018: 
81]. Pritchard’s view, then, is constituted by two main claims: the claim that hinges are enablers and the 
claim that hinges are not beliefs.  
Let us focus first on the claim that hinges are enablers.  Following Wittgenstein, Pritchard 
claims that hinge-commitments, by enjoying a high degree of certainty, constitute the framework 
that makes all our rational evaluations of ordinary beliefs possible. Their truth is presupposed by all 
of our ordinary beliefs and by our epistemic practices of rational evaluation; without these 
presuppositions, our claims about whether and how an agent’s evidence is sufficiently indicative of 
the truth of an empirical proposition would not even make sense. Hence, hinge-commitments are 
essential to our epistemic practices of rational evaluation but they lie outside the scope of such a 
practice.  
As for his claim that hinges are not beliefs, Pritchard stresses that hinge-commitments, as we 
have seen, are not subject to any rational evaluation and so, hinge-commitments cannot be beliefs. 
The main premise behind this reasoning is that belief is a mental state which is by nature subject to 
evidential considerations, and so, any mental state with a different nature cannot be a belief.   
In what follows, I will grant Pritchard’s claim that hinges are enablers. However, I will take 
issue with the claim that hinges are not beliefs; arguments like the one that Pritchard offers for this 
claim presuppose that the best explanation of why holders of hinge-commitments usually lack some 
dispositions that holders of beliefs have is that hinge-commitments and beliefs are different mental 
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states. I will offer an alternative explanation of this phenomenon that is compatible with the claim 
that hinge-commitments are beliefs. Finally, I will outline two reasons for the claim that hinge-
commitments are beliefs.  
3. Hinge-Commitments as Beliefs 
If hinge-commitments were beliefs, this would have important consequences for other 
debates in epistemology and the theory of epistemic rationality. In particular, it would constitute a 
reason to think that beliefs are not as tightly conceptually linked to evidence as some have thought, 
and so that it is not impossible to have beliefs that are neither rational nor irrational. However, all of 
the hinge-epistemologists I have discussed (Coliva, Wright, and Pritchard) deny this claim. Of them, 
Pritchard is the only one who has developed an explicit argument for the conclusion that hinge-
commitments are not beliefs [2016: 90]. However, it is likely that this argument is seconded by 
Coliva and Wright too. In what follows, I will offer some reasons to think that Pritchard’s argument, 
and any argument along the same argumentative lines, at best, will reach a standoff of intuitions with 
someone who, like me, does think that hinge-commitments are beliefs. If Pritchard’s argument is 
wanting, then we lack good reasons to accept that hinge-commitments are not beliefs. This result 
might constitute a reason to abandon such a claim given that it is uncontroversial that we should not 
postulate new types of entities—including mental states—to explain a phenomenon if we do not 
need to. The reader should keep in mind that the conclusions reached in this section not only affect 
Pritchard’s position, but also Coliva’s and Wright’s. 
Consider the following reconstruction (and development) of Pritchard’s argument: 
Hinge-commitments are not quitters 1 (HQ-1). 
1. In virtue of their nature, beliefs are mental states that agents are disposed to give up when 
they have no good evidence for them.  
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2. However, for hinge-commitments this is not true. Agents have no good evidence for their 
hinge-commitments, but they are not disposed to give them up. 
Therefore,  
3. Hinge-commitments are not beliefs.  
This reconstruction is not off to a good start. Although it is valid, HQ-1 is unsound because 
premise (1) is false. Consider how agents with some ordinary empirical belief that P react when they 
have counter-evidence against their belief that P. In some cases, such an agent would give up her 
belief that P—these cases would be the perfect model for premise (1). However, there are many 
other cases, cases of confirmation bias for example, where agents ignore that counter-evidence and 
pay more attention to selective evidence that they consider supports their belief that P. This shows 
us that, even in perfectly normal cases, when believers have no good evidence for their beliefs, they 
are not always disposed to give them up. A different reconstruction of the argument has to be 
offered to defend the claim that hinge-commitments are not beliefs.  
Pritchard might weaken premise one and instead give the following argument: 
Hinge-commitments are not quitters 2 (HQ-2). 
1. In virtue of their nature, beliefs are mental states that agents are disposed to give up when 
they themselves come to judge that their evidence does not sufficiently support them.  
2. However, for hinge-commitments this is not true. Even after agents themselves come to 
judge that their evidence does not sufficiently support their hinge-commitments, they are 
not disposed to give them up.  
Therefore,  
3. Hinge-commitments are not beliefs.  
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It seems that HQ-2 is better off than HQ-1, since it restricts the first premise to those cases 
in which agents do not avoid the recognition that they have no good evidence for their beliefs. The 
second premise of this argument is based on the plausible intuition that in cases where agents do not 
have sufficient evidence for a hinge-commitment, agents are often nevertheless not tempted to give 
up such a commitment — such as when philosophers learn about Hume’s problem of induction. 
However, it should still be clear that, by itself, this is not a dialectically compelling argument for 
people who think that hinge-commitments are beliefs.  For them, the disposition described in 
premise (1) is not an essential dispositions of belief, and so they will not accept this premise. At best, 
with this argument alone we would end up with a standoff of intuitions.  
Someone might want to break this impasse by pointing out an advantage of claiming that 
hinge-commitments are not beliefs: it gives us an explanation of why holders of “standard” beliefs 
have the disposition to give them up when they come to judge that their evidence does not 
sufficiently support them, but holders of hinge-commitments usually lack the same disposition. By 
contrast, they might claim, if hinge-commitments are beliefs, we cannot explain this difference. I 
want to suggest a different explanation of this difference which is compatible with the claim that 
hinge-commitments are beliefs. This explanation is based on something that I think should not be 
too controversial for hinge-epistemologists in general.  
Hinge-epistemologists accept that hinge-commitments are enablers of epistemic rationality. 
For Coliva and Wright, hinge-commitments allow us to engage in rational deliberation. For 
Pritchard, hinge-commitments enable rational evaluations. I want to suggest that another way in 
which hinge-commitments enable epistemic rationality is by providing us with a way of 
understanding the world; they give us a worldview.32 One way in which hinge-commitments give us 
 
32 I think that this claim should not be too controversial because hinge-epistemologists tend to follow many of the views 
that Wittgenstein had about hinges. One of them is that hinges give us a worldview: ‘…I did not get my picture of the 
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a worldview is by informing the way we interpret our experiences as telling us how the world is. For 
example, in our current situation, we hold the proposition that there is an external world as a hinge-
commitment. This commitment informs the way we understand when and which of our experiences 
are to be considered as evidence about how the world is; we understand that through our visual, 
auditory and sensory perceptions we learn some properties of ordinary objects that we are in contact 
with. One plausible explanation of why we are not as easily disposed to give up our hinge-
commitments when we realize that the evidence does not sufficiently support them is that they 
inform our worldview in this respect and giving them up without having a rational replacement for 
them is psychologically very difficult given that we are beings that cannot opt out of rational agency.  
This explanation is an alternative way of understanding why in normal circumstances we do 
not show the same dispositions to give up hinge-commitments as we do with other beliefs which do 
not inform our worldview in this way. With this explanation we do not need to postulate a new 
mental state that behaves exactly like beliefs in every other aspect. Notice that while our hinge-
commitments inform our worldview to a particularly strong degree, it also seems plausible that our 
other beliefs do so to some degree. If this is so, this would explain why our resistance to giving up a 
belief when we realize that we have no evidence to support it is a phenomenon that is not exclusive 
to our hinge-commitments, but also applies to many of our other beliefs (like our moral or political 
beliefs).  This suggests that the degree of resistance to giving up our beliefs when we realize that we 
have no evidence to support them tracks their importance in our worldview: the deeper the 
importance of our belief in our worldview, the harder it is to give it up. At one extreme, we would 
find a strong resistance to give up a belief when we realize that we lack sufficient evidence for it; at 
 
world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the 




the other end, a strong disposition to give it up. Each of our beliefs is located at some point on this 
spectrum.  
Furthermore, even though beliefs in hinge-propositions are such that agents are not usually 
inclined to give them up in the aforementioned situations, we have reason to think that in some 
cases agents would give them up. In other words, we have reasons to think that, just as “standard” 
beliefs can be responsive to evidence, beliefs in hinge-propositions can too.  Take, for example, 
cases like the flashing signpost scenario. In such cases, agents stop holding as true very general 
hinge-commitments like ‘there is an external world’ as a consequence of gaining evidence against 
such commitments — they see signposts that say that they are living in a simulation, they notice that 
things start appearing and disappearing in front of everyone’s eyes as a sign that the message in the 
signpost is true. Consider another example: Ludwig Wittgenstein considered the proposition ‘No 
one has ever been to the moon’ a hinge-commitment [OC 106]. In 1969, we got evidence against 
such a commitment, and so, the proposition ‘no one has ever been to the moon’ ceased to be taken 
as true. The fact that after 1969 people stopped holding ‘no one has ever been to the moon’ seems 
to be directly explained by the evidence they got on the news. And so it seems that, after all, this 
hinge-commitment was responsive to evidence (even though at one point there was no evidence for 
or against it). These examples suggest that hinge-commitments can be responsive to rational 
considerations after all. And so, not only do both hinge-commitments and standard beliefs inform 
our worldview to some degree but both can also be responsive to rational considerations. That 
“standard” beliefs and hinge-commitments share these two features supports the claim that hinge-
commitments are beliefs.  
A question might arise: if beliefs in hinge-propositions are on the ‘hard to give up’ end of the 
spectrum, why do agents easily give them up in cases like the flashing signpost? The answer is 
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twofold: (i) in cases in which our beliefs are paramount for our worldview, for agents to give up 
such beliefs, it is necessary that they judge that they have sufficient evidence to disbelieve them — it 
is not enough that they judge that they lack sufficient evidence for their hinge-commitments. (ii) 
Additionally, it is also necessary that agents have a replacement for them, such that they go from 
having one way of interpreting what their experiences tell them about the world to another. In the 
flashing signpost scenario, for example, after judging that there is sufficient evidence against ‘there is 
an external world’ the agent can replace that hinge-commitment with another along the lines of ‘I’m 
living in a simulation’. It is relatively easy to give up a hinge-commitment as long as (i) and (ii) are 
met; what it is psychologically difficult about giving hinge-commitments up when we cannot satisfy 
(i) and (ii) is to thereby become an agent without a worldview.  
In this section, I pointed out that HQ-2 would not advance the dispute among people who 
think that hinge-commitments are not beliefs and people who think they are. I have suggested an 
advantageous way of advancing this dispute and conclude that we should think that hinge-
commitments are beliefs.   
Possible replies 
Before I summarize the hinge-epistemology view that has emerged from this paper, let me 
briefly consider one reply that Pritchard might offer in defense of the claim that hinge-commitments 
are not beliefs:  
Hinge-commitments transform into beliefs (HTIB). One characteristic of hinge-commitments is that 
the people who have them are not responsive to evidential considerations —they just accept 
them. In the circumstances in which an agent acquires evidence against a hinge-commitment 
that P, one of two things might happen. First, the agent might cease to accept P, and either 
form a belief that not-P or suspend judgement about whether P. Or, second, the agent might 
continue to accept P in the face of evidence against its truth. In this second case, their 
acceptance – which would now be irrational – would now be a belief, rather than a hinge-
commitment (since only beliefs can be rationally evaluated).  
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The general idea behind HTIB is based on the second premise of HQ-2, and the negation of 
the claim I made in the previous section that hinge-commitments can be responsive to evidential 
considerations. Pritchard might accept that in some cases it might seem like hinge-commitments can 
and should be responsive to evidential considerations, but he might argue that these are not cases in 
which the relevant state is actually a hinge-commitment. When a hinge commitment seems to be 
such that at least it ought to become sensitive to rational evidential considerations, that indicates that 
such a mental state has somehow transformed into a belief. Therefore, not only are holders of 
hinge-commitments not disposed to give them up when they realize that their evidence does not 
sufficiently support them, but also, hinge-commitments are not responsive to rational evidential 
considerations at all. This response is meant to accentuate the differences between hinge-
commitments and beliefs and by doing so support the claim that they are different mental states.  
An undesired consequence of HTIB is that it commits us to the claim that a subject can go 
from having one mental state (a hinge-commitment) to having a different one (a belief), without 
undergoing any behavioral or psychological changes on their part regarding the mental state in question. 
Consider an agent, Truman, who is living in the flashing signpost scenario. Before the flashing 
signpost scenario occurred, Truman held the hinge-commitment that there is an external world. 
Once the flashing signpost scenario occurs, Truman acquires a body of evidence which sufficiently 
supports believing that there is no external world. According to HTIB, either Truman stops 
accepting that there is an external world, or he might irrationally come to believe the proposition 
that there is an external world. The first disjunct seems unproblematic, but the second might be 
problematic if Truman’s response to the flashing signpost scenario is to simply fail to incorporate 
the implications of his evidence into his cognitive life. In this case, the evidence that Truman gains 
makes no psychological impact on his relation to the proposition that there is an external world. So 
HTIB implies that without undergoing any psychological change towards some proposition p —i.e., 
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without changing the way they think about that proposition— an agent can go from having some 
non-belief state toward p to (irrationally) believing it. HTIB, then, is a costly strategy for vindicating 
the claim that hinge-commitments are not beliefs.  
An additional problem for the HTIB response is that it seems to deliver an uncharacteristic 
feature of the type of phenomenon it describes. Normally, instances in which agents can go from 
holding a mental state that P which is not sensitive to rational considerations to holding a belief that 
not-P, which is sensitive to rational considerations, are such that the agent who is undergoing this 
shift is also able to hold both mental states at the same time. Think of desires. Desires are not 
essentially responsive to evidential considerations, and are such that an agent can go from desiring 
that P, to believing that not-P. But it is also possible that an agent can come to believe that not-P 
and keep desiring that P.  If an agent desires that she will jump really high in her next try, and she 
gains counter-evidence that she will not, then she might go from having a desire that P, to having a 
belief that not-P. But she also can come to believe that not-P, even though she keeps desiring that P. 
The same is true of other mental states that are not essentially responsive to rational evidential 
considerations like assumptions, fears, imaginations, etc.33 But this is not the case for hinge-
commitments and beliefs. According to Pritchard, whenever it seems that our hinge-commitments 
are responsive to evidence, that means that we are not holding hinge-commitments but beliefs. If 
someone sympathetic to Pritchard wanted to adopt the idea that hinge-commitments transform into 
 
33 Someone might object that this also happens with hope; when an agent goes from hoping that P to believing that not-
P, she cannot keep hoping that P. They would claim that if this is so, then this feature which I’m describing as 
“uncharacteristic” of these type of cases might be more common than I presented it. This criticism can be easily brushed 
off by pointing out that in the philosophical literature, hope is regarded as a mental state that is constituted completely 
or partly by ‘a combination of a desire for an outcome and the belief that the outcome is possible but not certain’ [Martin, 
2014]. Hope, then, it is considered to have an element which is sensitive to rational considerations (i.e., a belief that P is 
possibly true). It should not be a surprised that an agent cannot keep hoping that P (which implies that P can be true), 




beliefs, they need to explain what is so special about hinge-commitments that it is impossible for an 
agent to hold it in conjunction with a belief with the same or the opposite propositional content.  
It is not impossible that someone would be tempted to accept these bad consequences if they 
have no positive reasons to think that hinge-commitments are beliefs. Let me provide you with two 
reasons: 
1) If hinge-commitments are beliefs, then we have a simpler way of explaining why when an 
agent starts believing that not P, they cannot keep their hinge-commitment that P. The 
explanation is that in these cases agents go from believing that P to believing that not-P, and 
that is why it is psychologically impossible for non-fragmented agents to have both mental 
states at the same time. The best explanation of this phenomenon is that hinge-commitments 
are beliefs. 
2) An additional argument we can give for the claim that hinge-commitments are beliefs is an 
application of Occam’s Razor. If hinge-commitments are just beliefs, then we do not need to 
populate our ontologies with unnecessary entities. If hinge-commitments are beliefs then we 
get the simplest explanation of their nature because we do not have to commit to a difficult 
explanation of why two distinct mental states are almost exactly alike (they are 
phenomenologically the same for the subject, they guide the subject in similar ways, they are 
inferentially promiscuous, etc.)34 
In what follows, I will summarize the resulting NRG view about the nature of hinge-
commitments which has emerged from the discussion. It agrees with Pritchard that hinge-
 




commitments are arational, and (contrary to Pritchard, Coliva and Wright) holds that hinge-
commitments are beliefs.  
4. The Arational Beliefs View of Hinge-Commitments 
So far, I have shown that none of the three views I have considered seems to give us the 
right result about the nature of hinge-commitments. Within the BRG, Coliva’s view is subject to 
flashing signpost scenarios because she holds that there is a particular hinge-commitment that we 
must hold regardless of the circumstances as long as we are able to engage in rational epistemic 
practices. Both Coliva’s and Wright’s views are subject to further criticism because they are 
committed to the claim that we are entitled or warranted in holding hinge-commitments because 
they are enablers of epistemic rationality; however, it is far from clear how these features are 
connected. Within the NRG, Pritchard’s view is subject to criticism for his claim that hinge-
commitments are not beliefs; the best version of his argument implies some undesired consequences 
which we can avoid by rejecting its conclusion. Coliva’s and Wright’s views are also subject to this 
criticism. 
However, these three views hold some commitments which seem on the right track. First, 
each of these views agrees that our hinge-commitments somehow enable our practices of rational 
evaluation. Second, Pritchard’s view expands on this enabling feature of hinge-commitments to 
draw the conclusion that they are not subject to rational evaluation. According to him, because 
hinge-commitments serve as the framework for any rational evaluation, they are outside the scope of 
what can be rationally evaluated, and so they are arational.  
Keeping these two commitments, I want to offer a different NRG view, the Arational 
Beliefs View. This view has the advantages that the three other views have but it is not subject to 
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any of the criticisms they are subject to. This makes it the best way of understanding hinge-
commitments. The Arational Beliefs View has the following three features: 
1. Hinge-commitments are beliefs.   
2. Hinge-commitments are not subject to rational evaluation; they are arational.35 
3. Hinge-commitments are enablers of our practices of epistemic rationality (rational 
deliberation and rational evaluation) as long as they inform our worldview at its core.  
With the Arational Beliefs View, we can offer a solution to our initial puzzle. We should give 
up claim (d) of our puzzle; that is, we should claim that hinge-commitments are not rational. But, 
what I have claimed is that the fact that a belief is not rational does not ipso facto mean that such a 
belief is irrational. Some beliefs can be arational as long as they are playing the enabling role 
described in (3) above. The proposition that there is an external world, and any other hinge-
commitments we have, cannot be independently supported by any piece of ordinary evidence 
because it is constitutive of the way we understand any relevant piece of evidence that we take our 
hinge-commitments as true. This fact explains why intuitively we take them to be rationally held. 
However, given their role as enablers of rational evaluation, hinge-commitments are in fact not 
subject to rational evaluation; they are arational.  
To conclude, I want to stress that, on my view, there is nothing in any particular hinge-
commitment that in any circumstance makes it such that it cannot lose this role as enabler 
understood as informing our worldview. Thus, my view is not subject to flashing signpost-type 
counterexamples.  When a belief is not playing this role, it becomes subject to our common 
practices of epistemic appraisal: it is rational if supported by the evidence, irrational if not. The 
 
35 In his [2007], Avnur has sketched the skeleton of a similar view regarding these two points. However, he does not 
develop any details of the view.  
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explanation for this is simple: hinge-commitments are beliefs that are playing the contingent role of 
informing our worldview; but the way we think about the world might be mistaken. We might at 
some point judge that one of our hinge-commitments is false, and, at that moment, that particular 
belief would stop informing our worldview at its core. If so, it would become subject to rational 



























CHAPTER 3. A NOVEL NORMATIVIST APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF BELIEF 
Introduction 
What makes a mental state a belief as opposed to, let us say, a hope? Some philosophers 
have argued that what distinguishes beliefs from other types of mental states is that beliefs are 
essentially normative in virtue of being at least partly constituted by some norms. Those norms are 
called the constitutive norms of belief. Philosophers who accept that beliefs are at least partly 
constituted by these norms are called normativists. According to normativists, then, the constitutive 
norms of belief are unique to beliefs. Hopes and any other mental states that are not beliefs cannot 
be constituted by the constitutive norms of belief.  
Prominent normativist views, which I will refer to as ‘Conventional Normativism’, have 
argued that beliefs are at least partly constituted by norms in virtue of being essentially subject to 
them. There have been two main ways in which Conventional Normativism has been developed. 
The first approach argues that beliefs are constituted by or are essentially subject to what we might 
call input-side norms (or input-side requirements of rationality)—i.e., requirements to rationally 
manage our mental states in accordance with some inputs, like our evidence. The second approach 
argues that beliefs are not only constituted by or essentially subject to input-side rational norms but 
also output-side rational norms—i.e., requirements to proceed in certain rational ways given the 
mental state we are in. 
People who find Conventional Normativism attractive tend to think about the following 
input-side norm as the paradigmatic case of a constitutive norm of belief:  
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Sufficient Evidence: It is rationally required that beliefs are held on the basis of sufficient 
evidence.   
Recently, some philosophers36 have noticed that it is also possible to consider output-side 
norms as constitutive of belief. In particular, norms that feature beliefs and that tell you how to 
proceed given your beliefs. One of these norms is:  
Instrumental Rationality: It is rationally required that if an agent believes that M is the 
necessary means to an end E, and she has the end E (and has no conflicting end that trumps 
E), then she intends to do M.  
 
Sufficient Evidence states the intuitive idea that agents are rationally required to be such that 
whenever they believe that P, they do so on the basis of evidence which indicates that P is 
sufficiently more likely to be true than ~P.  For example, I am rationally required to be such that if I 
believe that it will rain, that belief is supported by, let us say, my perception that it is cloudy and the 
Weather Channel’s report I read that day where it says that it will rain. But if my evidence did not 
even suggest that it is likely to rain, then I should not believe that it will rain. Instrumental 
Rationality states the intuitive idea that agents are rationally required to be such that when they have 
a goal, and they believe that some means is necessary to achieve that goal, they intend those 
means—at least in those cases in which they have no other conflicting goals or ends. For example, I 
am required to be such that if I believe that it will rain and I do not want to get wet, and I also 
believe that the only way for me to stay dry is to bring my umbrella, then I intend to bring my 
umbrella.  
Two of the main conventional normativist strategies have argued that input-side norms, in 
particular Sufficient Evidence, are constitutive of belief in virtue of beliefs being essentially subject 
to this norm. The main goal of this paper is to show that after careful consideration, we should 
 
36 See Nolfi 2015. 
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conclude both that Sufficient Evidence is not such a constitutive norm of belief and also that we 
should reject Conventional Normativism in favor of a new approach that I will call Commitment 
Normativism, a view that states that beliefs are essentially normative in virtue of imposing output-
side norms on the believer and/or her other mental states.  
Here is the plan for the rest of the paper. First, I will present two popular approaches to 
Conventional Normativism: the truth norm approach and the proper-function norm approach. The 
truth norm approach takes beliefs to be partly constituted only by input-side norms, in virtue of 
being subject to them. The proper-function norm approach takes beliefs to be partly constituted 
both by input-side and output-side norms also in virtue of being subject to them. Both approaches, I 
will argue, are committed to take Sufficient Evidence to be a constitutive norm of belief, but only 
the latter takes Instrumental Rationality to be so. After I have summarized these two approaches, I 
will explain why I think both of them are mistaken: a certain class of beliefs, that I will call hinge-
proposition beliefs, like the belief that there is an external world, are not subject to the alleged 
constitutive requirement of belief Sufficient Evidence — and so such a requirement cannot be 
constitutive of belief. Given the failure of these two approaches, I will offer a novel way of thinking 
about normativism: Commitment Normativism. According to Commitment Normativism, the 
norms that are constitutive of belief are only the output-side norms, i.e. the norms that having a 
belief imposes on the believer and/or her other mental states. These norms spring from the agent’s 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. So, on this way of thinking about the distinctive 
normative profile of beliefs, the norms that are constitutive of beliefs are only output-side norms, 
like Instrumental Rationality.  
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1. Two Approaches to Conventional Normativism 
Normativism about belief, broadly speaking, is the view that beliefs are at least partly 
constituted by norms. Conventional Normativism adds to this claim that beliefs are at least partly 
constituted by norms in virtue of being subject to those norms. Conventional normativist strategies37 
about belief, just like any normativist strategy, can be stated in terms of a normative and a 
descriptive claim. The normative claim says that the essence of the mental state of belief is normative; 
part of what it is to be a belief is to necessarily be subject to or to impose some norms (i.e., the 
constitutive norms of belief). The descriptive claim says that part of what it is for a mental state to be a 
belief is for the agent who holds it to necessarily have dispositions to satisfy all of the norms that are 
constitutive of beliefs (at least to some extent).38 The descriptive claim, then, entails that a norm of 
belief is constitutive of it only if the descriptive claim is true of it. 39  
Some people might doubt that a normativist needs to be committed to the descriptive claim. 
They might claim that the normativist strategy only needs to be committed to the normative claim: 
that what we need to explain is the normative profile of belief and not the dispositions that agents 
have or lack to satisfy norms that we find to be constitutive of belief. But this way of thinking about 
normativism is not fruitful. There are (plausibly) both constitutive and non-constitutive norms of 
belief, so any normativist account will need to say something about how we can distinguish the 
 
37 For brevity I will stop specifying that the conventional normativist strategy or the type of normativism I am concerned 
with is the one specific to belief.  
 
38 For brevity, in what follows I will omit the clause ‘at least to some extent’ for the descriptive claim.  
 
39 Wedgwood (2007) and Nolif (2015) argue for their normativist views about the nature of belief by adopting a 
descriptive account of the capacity for belief. On the dispositional account they prefer, believers have to have 
dispositions to regulate and manage some of their attitudes in ways that constitute (or closely approximate) a rationally 
permissible regulation of beliefs; if agents did not have these dispositions (at least to some extent), they would not count 
as having the capacity for belief. Nolfi and Wedgwood claim that the best way of explaining this feature of the capacity 
for belief is by understanding beliefs as partly constituted by such norms of rational regulation. This understanding about 
the capacity for belief, I think, just is an open endorsement on their part of what I call the descriptive claim.  
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constitutive norms from the non-constitutive ones. I think that the best way to do this is to appeal 
to the descriptive claim. I will explore one alternative way in which people might want to account 
for the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive norms in general, and argue that 
adopting both the normative and the descriptive claim is better for this purpose. Thus, the best 
version of normativism is one that embraces both claims.  
One might think that constitutive norms can be differentiated from non-constitutive norms 
by their necessity; only norms that are constitutive of beliefs necessarily apply to all beliefs. 
However, appealing to necessity alone is not enough to pick out the constitutive norms. This is 
because there are (at least arguably) many non-constitutive norms that beliefs are subject to 
necessarily. Consider the following plausible non-constitutive norm for belief: you are required to 
believe only those things, such that believing them will not result in the death of millions of people. 
Clearly this norm features beliefs, and given what morality requires of us, this is a necessary norm. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem that this norm is really constitutive of belief; this norm does not help 
us understand the nature of what it is to believe something to be true.  
Timothy Williamson (2000) has said about constitutive norms: ‘if it is a constitutive rule that 
one must φ, then it is necessary that one must φ. More precisely, a rule will count as constitutive of 
an act only if it is essential to that act: necessarily the rule governs every performance of the act.’ (p. 
239) But he thinks that in addition to the necessary character of a constitutive norm ‘some sensitivity 
to the difference—in both one-self and others—between conforming to the rule and breaking it’ 
(p.240) is a necessary condition of performing the act the norm is constitutive of. If we extrapolate 
this to constitutive norms of belief, then we would have the following view:  
Williamson-constitutive: A norm is constitutive of belief only if it necessarily governs 
every instance of believing and it is a necessary condition of counting as having a belief that 




Williamson-constitutive gives us a better way of telling apart the norms that are constitutive 
of beliefs and the ones that are not. According to it, the above norm about believing only those 
things that would not cause the death of millions of people is not a constitutive norm of belief 
because having some sensitivity to what it means for someone to break or satisfy this norm does not 
seem to be a necessary condition to count as having a belief. It does not matter that such a norm 
necessarily governs every instance of believing.  
One might think then, that a normativist does not need to commit to both a normative and 
a descriptive claim but only to the normative claim, and also endorse Williamson-constitutive when 
determining what norms are constitutive of belief. But it should be easy to see that Williamson-
constitutive is compressing a normative and a descriptive claim (a claim about the character of 
constitutive norms, and a claim about what it takes to count as having a belief), so being committed 
to a normative claim and endorsing Williamson-constitutive just is to be committed to both a 
normative and a descriptive claim.  
Even though a normativist does not need to commit to embracing both the normative and 
the descriptive claim, I think it should be uncontroversial that that the best normativist strategy has 
to embrace both the normative and the descriptive claim. Embracing both claims allows her to 
explain the normative profile of belief and to have a story about what makes a belief-related norm a 
constitutive norm of belief. I will now present two important developments of Conventional 
Normativism: the truth norm approach and the proper-function norm approach. Each of which in 
their best form, encompassing both a normative and a descriptive claim.  
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1.1 The Truth Norm Approach40 
Ralph Wedgwood has a picture of belief according to which (at least part of) what it means 
for a mental state to be a belief is for that state to be subject to a fundamental truth norm that states 
that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true. This norm is fundamental in the 
sense that it cannot be further explained and it explains all other constitutive norms of belief. Now, 
we cannot just conform with the truth norm—we are not the type of beings that can decide to 
believe just what is true and do it—but we can satisfy other norms, the non-fundamental 
constitutive norms of belief, the satisfaction of which would increase our chances of having true 
beliefs or to have beliefs that conform with the truth norm.   
For Wedgwood, the non-fundamental constitutive norms of belief are evidentialist input-
side norms the satisfaction of which makes it more likely that beliefs conform with the fundamental 
truth norm. And, although he does not explicitly commit to any particular input-side norm, it is not 
difficult to see that Sufficient Evidence is the most plausible candidate to be one of the input-side 
norms that makes it more likely that our beliefs conform with the truth norm. Without any other 
means to figure out what is true, using our evidence as our basis for forming and managing our 
beliefs is our best strategy for determining whether a proposition is likely to be true, and hence to 
have a correct belief. Regardless of what other input-side norms could turn out to be constitutive of 
belief, Sufficient Evidence must be one of them.  
We can capture Wedgwood’s normativist picture of belief with the following two claims, 
which I call the Normative Claim I and the Descriptive Claim I:  
 
40 The truth norm approach is by far the most influential normativist strategy and it has been defended independently by 
David Velleman and Nishi Shah (2005), Nishi Shah (2003), David Velleman (2000) and Ralph Wedgwood (2002, 2007, 
2013) among others. In this proposal, I will only focus on Wedgwood’s view, which I take to be the one that explicitly is 
a view about the nature of the mental state belief and not only of the concept ‘belief’. 
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The Normative Claim I:  Part of what it is for something to be a belief is for it to be 
constitutively subject to a requirement to be such that it is likely to be true. Thus, a belief is 
constitutively subject to the fundamental truth norm and to input-side norms of rationality, 
such as Sufficient Evidence, that make it more likely that beliefs are true.  
The Descriptive Claim I: Part of what it is for a mental state to be a belief is for the agent who 
holds it to necessarily have some dispositions to satisfy the input-side norms that are 
constitutive of belief, such as Sufficient Evidence41.  
1.2 The Proper-Function Norm Approach 
A different version of Conventional Normativism is advanced by Kate Nolfi (2015)42. Nolfi 
partially agrees with Wedgwood’s normative and descriptive claims. She, with him, thinks both that 
some input-side norms the satisfaction of which would make it more likely that beliefs are true are 
constitutive of belief, and also that for an agent to count as a believer she must have some minimum 
dispositions to manage her beliefs in accordance with such input-side norms. But Nolfi argues that 
in order to have the capacity for belief it is not enough that the agent necessarily has dispositions to 
satisfy input-side norms — she must also have at least some minimum dispositions to satisfy some 
belief-related output-side norms. Thus, for Nolfi, not only input-side norms but also some output-
side norms must be constitutive of belief.  
To support her view, Nolfi asks us to think of an arbitrary agent who, although she has all 
the dispositions to regulate her “beliefs” in accordance with input-side norms such as Sufficient 
Evidence, does not display any disposition to regulate the same “beliefs” in accordance with any 
output-side rational requirement for belief. She, for example, does not use her “beliefs” about the 
means necessary for her goals to achieve any goals she might have. She does not even use her 
“beliefs” about where to get water when thirsty or about how to move around the city safely when 
 
41 Wedgwood seems to concede that it is plausible that a norm like Sufficient Evidence is constitutive of belief (2007, 
p.154) 
 
42 Nolfi’s views about normativism have evolved since her (2015). For the purpose of this paper I will just engage with 
her initial take on this issue.  
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crossing streets. Nolfi claims that this agent is too far away from the paradigm of a believer to count 
as one. She thinks that the best way to explain why having dispositions to satisfy output-side rational 
norms is necessary to count as a believer or as having the capacity for belief is to claim that beliefs 
are also constituted by such output-side norms. So, for a mental state to count as a belief, the agent 
who holds it has to have dispositions not only to manage it in accordance with input-side norms, 
like Sufficient Evidence, but also to satisfy output-side norms. Wedgwood’s truth norm approach 
can explain why, for a particular mental state to be a belief, the believer must have input-side rational 
dispositions, but not why they must have output-side ones. Nolfi’s proper-function norm approach 
promises to explain both. 
Nolfi has a picture of belief according to which beliefs are a type of mental state that can be 
successful or unsuccessful. She thinks that beliefs are the type of mental state that is successful only 
when it is well suited to fulfill its proper function. So, in contrast to Wedgwood, for her, what it 
means for a mental state to be a belief is for it to be subject to a fundamental proper-function norm 
which states that a belief is correct if and only if it is disposed to fulfill its proper function (and that 
falls short when it is not). Although Nolfi does not commit herself to a fully characterized function 
of belief, she claims that the proper function of belief might be captured by the function “to inform 
our decisions to act by serving as a kind of map of the way things are so that we achieve whichever 
ends our actions aim to achieve” (p.197) With this in mind, Nolfi’s fundamental norm of belief says 
that a belief is correct if and only if it is “disposed to inform our actions by serving as a kind of map 
so that our actions successfully achieve the ends that our actions are meant to achieve” (p. 198). 
Nolfi thinks that this new version of the fundamental norm can help us explain not only input-side 
constitutive norms of belief but also output-side requirements that impose constraints on mental 
states other than beliefs. On Nolfi’s view, that beliefs are subject to input-side requirements like 
Sufficient Evidence can be explained by noticing that if the agent’s beliefs are true, this results in the 
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agent creating a more accurate map of the world, which in turn would help the subject to better 
achieve her goals. That beliefs are constituted by output-side requirements such as Instrumental 
Rationality can be explained by noticing that, in circumstances in which the agent has a goal, some 
relevant beliefs about the best means to achieve such goals would inform an intention to take such 
means, which in turn would help the subject to better achieve her goals. In both cases, if the agent 
satisfies those requirements, then she is more likely to comply with the proper-function norm and 
so, Nolfi claims, beliefs must be subject to such requirements.43  
From this picture of belief, we can read her as making two constitutive claims about beliefs 
that I will call the Normative Claim II and the Descriptive Claim II:  
The Normative Claim II. Part of what it is for something to be a belief is for it to be 
constitutively subject to a requirement to be such that it is likely to achieve its proper 
function. Thus a belief is subject to the fundamental proper-function norm, and to input-
side and output-side norms of rationality the satisfaction of which makes it more likely that 
beliefs play their proper function. In other words, it is constitutive of belief to be subject (1) 
to some input-side norms, like Sufficient Evidence and (2) to some output-side requirements 
of rationality like Instrumental Rationality.  
The Descriptive Claim II. Part of what it is for a mental state to be a belief is for the agent who 
holds it to necessarily have some dispositions to satisfy both the input-side and the output-side 
norms that are constitutive of belief—e.g. Sufficient Evidence, and Instrumental Rationality.  
 
So far I have developed two different approaches to Conventional Normativism: 
Wedgwood’s truth norm approach and Nolfi’s proper-function norm approach. Wedgwood’s truth 
norm approach only takes input-side norms to be constitutive of beliefs—we have seen that 
Sufficient Evidence must be one of them. Nolfi’s proper-function norm approach, in contrast, takes 
both input-side and output-side norms to be constitutive of beliefs—again, the most plausible 
 
43 Nolfi, just as Wedgwood, does not specify which norms are constitutive of belief. However, just as with Wedgwood, it 
is easy to see that Sufficient Evidence and Instrumental Rationality must be among the norms that in her view are 
constitutive of belief. If having an accurate map of the world would make it more likely that beliefs fulfill their proper 
function, and the satisfaction of Sufficient Evidence is the best means we have to get true beliefs, it must be that 
Sufficient Evidence is a constitutive norm of belief for Nolfi. And if using our beliefs to achieve our goals makes it more 
likely that we achieve our goals, then Instrumental Rationality must be constitutive of belief on Nolfi’s view. 
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norms to count as constitutive of belief on her account are Sufficient Evidence and Instrumental 
Rationality. Insofar as Nolfi’s view explains further phenomena, her approach seems explanatorily 
superior to Wedgwood’s. 
However, I think both Wedgwood’s and Nolfi’s strategies rest on a false understanding of 
the nature of belief; we have reasons to think that Sufficient Evidence cannot be constitutive of 
belief. In the next section I will explain these reasons.   
2. A Problem 
As I argued in the previous section, it follows from Wedgwood’s and Nolfi’s accounts of the 
nature of belief that the rational norm Sufficient Evidence is a constitutive norm of belief. This view 
of belief is prima facie compelling; it can help us make sense of why other mental states like 
pretending that P or imagining that P are different mental states than believing that P. If I was, for 
example, “pretending” that no one is home but it would be impossible for me to keep “pretending” 
it after I see that someone is home, then it would look like I was never pretending it but believing it. 
Why? Because my mental state was responsive to evidence in a way that only beliefs tend to be. If 
on the other hand, I was “believing” that no one is home and after realizing that someone is home I 
still “believe” it, then it would look like I have been pretending it all along and never actually 
believed it. Relatedly, this view of belief helps us make sense of a strong intuition we have that the 
rational status of a belief depends on its relationship with the agent’s evidence. It seems natural to 
say that an agent has an irrational belief whenever they hold a belief that is not supported by their 
evidence. Think of an agent who believes that her partner just adopted a cat even though she has no 
evidence for this. The agent comes to believe this simply out of a desire to have another cat. In this 
case, we would criticize the agent for holding a belief in this way. Notice that this is important 
because, the thought goes, being able to correctly classify one and only one mental state as irrational 
whenever it lacks evidential support seems a strong indication that it is essential to the mental state 
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to be subject to such a standard. Think about other propositional attitudes like desire. I might desire 
that my partner adopts yet another cat even after noticing that my partner does not want more cats, 
and would not adopt one more just to make me happy. It might be better for my happiness if I did 
not hold such a desire despite knowing that it is very unlikely that it would come true, but that is 
completely different from saying that my desire is in itself irrational.44  
I agree that if Sufficient Evidence was a norm that all beliefs were subject to, then that would 
strongly suggest that such a norm is constitutive of belief (at least if we assume that the best 
explanation for why all beliefs are subject to a norm is that they are essentially subject to it). 
However, there are some beliefs that are not subject to Sufficient Evidence, and so, a fortiori, 
Sufficient Evidence cannot be a constitutive norm of belief. Let us look at how this is so in more 
detail.  
Following Wittgenstein (1969), we can argue for the view that there are some beliefs which 
cannot be supported by evidence, but which agents are nevertheless permitted to have (i.e., it is not 
irrational for agents to have them): beliefs in so-called hinge-propositions or hinge-proposition 
beliefs (HPBs).45 HPBs are beliefs which underlie all of our common beliefs about the world. For 
any empirical belief we hold, it implies other more basic propositions (or hinge-propositions), like 
the hinge-proposition that there is an external world, or that there is a past, or that there are other 
minds, etc.  For example, the belief that there is a computer in front of me implies that there is an 
external world, made up of physical objects, and so this belief relies on that the hinge-proposition 
 
44 What philosophers like Nolfi and Wedgwood claim is that however some other mental state is rationally evaluable, it is 
not by means of a requirement like Sufficient Evidence. This is compatible with the claim that desires can somehow be 
subject to rational evaluations. For two different views on how desires can be rationally evaluable see Hume (1888, pp. 
413—418), and Hubin (1991).  
 
45 In another paper I have argued that the attitudes we have about hinge-propositions are beliefs and that they cannot be 
supported by the agent’s evidence. 
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being true. Now, HPBs not only pervasively underlie all of our empirical beliefs, but they also 
cannot be supported by the agent’s evidence—unlike our common empirical beliefs. Let me explain 
this last claim. Given that the HPBs presupposed by any of our ordinary empirical beliefs are about 
contingent propositions, it is intuitive to think that any evidence that could serve as support for 
them has to be empirical.46 However, it is unclear what kind of empirical evidence could support our 
HPBs. Plausibly, a piece of evidence E supports a proposition P only if someone who does not 
already believe P can gain justification to believe P on the basis of E. But for any piece of ordinary 
empirical evidence that we can think of as a potential candidate for supporting any of the hinge-
propositions we believe, that piece of evidence cannot help an agent who does not already believe 
the relevant hinge-proposition to gain justification for it on its basis. And so, it seems that no piece 
of empirical evidence can support our HPBs. As an illustration, consider the HPB that there is an 
external world (understood as the belief that the world is populated by ordinary objects of 
perception—i.e., objects that exist even if no one is conscious of them, and that we are in contact 
with through our sense perception). And consider an arbitrary piece of evidence for it, let us say, 
that it seems that there is a computer in front of you. One might think that this piece of evidence 
supports that there is an external world because it is saying something like: ‘it looks like there is a 
computer in front of you. So, there is an ordinary object of perception’. But this piece of evidence is 
working under the assumption that there is an external world. Because if we were not assuming the 
truth of ‘there is an external world’, it would be open whether what seems to be an ordinary object 
perception is actually such an object. Given that someone who does not already believe that there is 
 
46 There are some people who, following Saul Kripke’s claim that it is possible to have a priori contingent knowledge, 
deny that just because a proposition is contingent, its justification has to be empirical or a posteriori. For one development 
of this view see Williamson (1986). For further discussion of this attempt see Hawthorne (2002) and Leech (2010). 
There have been, however, some attempts to argue that HPBs are justified a priori. For a defense of this view see Cohen 
(2010) and DeRose (2018). For a critical review of this line of argumentation see Worsnip (2019).  
For the purposes of this paper, however, I will take for granted the intuitive assumption that the justification for the 
HPBs underlying our ordinary empirical beliefs is empirical.   
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an external world cannot gain justification to believe that there is an external world on the basis of 
this piece of evidence, it cannot support our HPB that there is an external world. And so, 
generalizing, no piece of empirical evidence can support our HPBs.  
Even if our HPBs are not supported by evidence, we usually do not consider them irrational. 
Since all beliefs presuppose them, saying that HPBs are irrational would mean that all of our beliefs 
are irrational — but that seems to be an untenable result. The alternative47 is to think about HPBs as 
a condition of possibility of our practices of epistemic rationality; HPBs seem to constitute the 
framework that makes all our rational evaluations of ordinary beliefs possible. Their truth is 
presupposed by all of our ordinary beliefs and by our epistemic practices of rational evaluation; 
without these presuppositions, our claims about whether and how an agent’s evidence is sufficiently 
indicative of the truth of an empirical proposition would not even make sense. And so, in this 
interpretation of HPBs, by being on the outskirts of our epistemic practices as enablers of such 
practices they are exempt from rational evaluation: they are neither rational nor irrational.  
Given that HPBs are neither rational nor irrational, we can claim that they are not open to 
rational evaluation at all, and so not subject to Sufficient Evidence. This means that Sufficient 
Evidence is not a constitutive norm of HPBs. Hence, Wedgwood’s and Nolfi’s normative claims 
cannot be true: it’s not true that beliefs are constitutively subject to Sufficient Evidence.  
Even if someone doubts that HPBs challenge Nolfi’s and Wedgwood’s normative claims 
that beliefs are necessarily subject to Sufficient Evidence, HPBs still challenge Nolfi’s and 
Wedgwood’s descriptive claims—i.e., that for a mental state to be a belief the agent who holds it 
necessarily has to have minimum dispositions to regulate it in accordance with Sufficient Evidence. 
 




If this is true, given that a norm is constitutive of belief only if the descriptive claim is true of it, it 
follows that Sufficient Evidence isn’t constitutive of belief. 
First, let us recognize two things: (i) that it is true that in many cases agents hold beliefs 
which are not supported by their evidence, and (ii) that after an agent realizes that those beliefs are 
not supported by her evidence, she would usually be disposed to give them up. But (ii) does not 
hold in cases where the relevant beliefs are HPBs. Think of the HPB that inductive methods are 
justified methods of reasoning. Agents might realize that there is no independent evidence that 
sufficiently supports such a claim, but nevertheless (maybe given how natural they seem to them) 
keep believing that such methods must be somehow justified. That is, even after realizing that they 
are violating Sufficient Evidence by holding such a belief, they lack any disposition to amend their 
error and satisfy this requirement. A clear indication that agents have no disposition to satisfy 
Sufficient Evidence in this case is that they keep using inductive methods in their reasoning even 
after they have come to see that they do not have sufficient evidence for the truth that they are 
justified. Since 1739, when Hume presented what we now call the Problem of Induction,48 
philosophers have become aware that it is very difficult to give a justification of induction in a way 
that does not already presuppose the reliability of induction. Nevertheless, they are not disposed to 
give up their belief that these methods are perfectly adequate ways of reasoning, brushing aside 
Hume’s concerns. This is a clear case in which agents lack any disposition to satisfy Sufficient 
Evidence.  
This phenomenon seems to be true of HPBs in general. Therefore, the existence of HPBs 
entails that it cannot be true that Sufficient Evidence is a constitutive norm of beliefs. In other 
words, HPBs establish that Wedgwood’s and Nolfi’s normative and descriptive claims regarding 
 
48 See A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, part iii, section 6. 
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Sufficient Evidence are also false. Given that a norm is constitutive of belief only if the descriptive 
claim is true of it, it follows that Sufficient Evidence is not a constitutive norm of belief. So, on 
either front (the normative or the descriptive) HPBs present a challenge to the existing normativist 
accounts.49 If we want to be normativists about the nature of belief, we need to look for an 
alternative approach; a way that rejects the temptation to claim that the input-side norm Sufficient 
Evidence is a constitutive requirement of beliefs both normatively and descriptively. Before I 
advance such an alternative, let me consider a possible response that Nolfi and Wedgwood could 
give on behalf of the claim that Sufficient Evidence is a constitutive norm of belief.  
2.1 A Possible Response and Why It Fails 
Wedgwood or Nolfi could try to argue that the reason why HPBs are not subject to 
Sufficient Evidence is because they are not beliefs. Nolfi and Wedgwood might claim that in what 
we consider genuine cases of beliefs, agents behave very differently than in cases involving HPBs. In 
one case, agents are disposed to give up their beliefs when they notice that there is no evidence that 
supports them, but not so when HPBs are involved. This, they would claim, is enough to show that 
they are not the same type of mental state. The following is a schematic way of presenting this 
objection:  
(1) In what we consider cases of genuine belief, the agent is disposed to give up their 
beliefs when they realize they do not have any evidence that supports them. 
(2) In cases where the putative belief is an HPB, the agent is not disposed to give it up.  
(3) Therefore: HPBs are not beliefs. 
 
49 For different kinds of criticism against the standard normativists accounts see Gluer, K., & Wikforss, A. (2009), and 
Bykvist, K., & Hattiangadi, A. (2007). 
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Let me illustrate this line of thought. Let us start with premise (1). Consider an agent who 
believes that her friends are coming to visit her on Sunday. Unbeknownst to her, this belief was 
formed as a result of having a very vivid dream where her friends told her they will visit her on 
Sunday. It is very likely that this agent would be disposed to give up this belief as soon as she 
realizes that she formed this belief as a result of a dream. Most of us know that when we dream that 
X is the case, that does not mean that X is actually true. It is plausible that whenever we realize that 
some of our beliefs are the result of a dream we had, we would take it that we have no evidence for 
them and we would be disposed to give them up. Premise (1) is capturing a generalization of cases 
like this. 
Let us move on to premise (2). Let us consider an analogous case to the one above but 
involving HPBs. Without further reflection, an agent might think that all of her perceptual evidence 
supports her HPB that there is an external world. However, if upon reflection she were to discover 
that her perceptual evidence cannot support her HPB (because all of her perceptual evidence 
presupposes it), it is very unlikely that she would give it up. An agent’s awareness that her evidence 
does not support one of her HPBs does not trigger any disposition to give up that HPB. Premise (2) 
is capturing a generalization of cases like this. 
How is it that we get from these two premises to the conclusion that HPBs are not beliefs? 
Accepting that HPBs are not beliefs, the reasoning goes, is the best explanation of why in cases of 
what we consider genuine belief agents necessarily have dispositions to comply with Sufficient 
Evidence, whereas in the putative cases of “beliefs” in hinge-propositions agents have no such 
dispositions. If HPBs were beliefs, agents who have them would show similar dispositions to satisfy 
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Sufficient Evidence.50  If this line of reasoning is right, then Nolfi and Wedgwood can hold on to the 
thesis that beliefs are constitutively subject to an input-side norm like Sufficient Evidence.  
However, we can respond to this inference to the best explanation argument by giving an 
alternative and better explanation for why agents seem to have different dispositions for managing 
their HPBs that does not require us to accept that HPBs are not beliefs. The general thought of this 
alternative explanation is that beliefs inform our worldview and that HPBs do it at a fundamental 
level. As long as an agent’s belief is informing her worldview at a fundamental level, she will not be 
disposed to give it up even when she judges that her evidence does not support this belief. Let me 
develop this alternative explanation in more detail.   
Our beliefs constitute our view of how the world is—I believe that I am currently in the 
Northern hemisphere, that water is drinkable, that 2+2=4, that Berlin is the capital of Germany, and 
that there is an external world around me. Our beliefs dictate how we think the world is—we can 
call this our “worldview”. Of course, not all of our beliefs play an equally important role in shaping 
our worldview. Our worldview is complex, and some of its elements are more important than 
others; their degree of importance lies on a continuum, where on one extreme there are beliefs that 
are fundamental or of paramount importance for our worldview and on the other extreme there are 
beliefs that are non-fundamental and inconsequential for our worldview. That my worldview 
includes that there is a glass of water in front of me at this particular moment seems very 
inconsequential, it would not matter much for my worldview if that glass was behind me or did not 
exist. But other beliefs we have are more important to our worldview, for example our political or 
religious beliefs. If we were to have different political or religious beliefs, our worldview would 
dramatically change. In a similar fashion, some of our beliefs are so important to our worldview that 
 
50 Pritchard (2018), has claimed that HPBs are not beliefs but other belief-like mental state because HPBs are not subject 
to rational considerations such as satisfying Sufficient Evidence. A. Coliva (2015) seems to share this view.  
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they are fundamental. Fundamental in the sense that they make the rest of our other beliefs 
intelligible. This is the particular way in which I think HPBs inform our world view. 51 Take the HPB 
that there is an external world. This HPB informs our world view by telling us how to understand 
our sense experiences. By having this HPB, we take it that through our visual, auditory and sensory 
perceptions we learn some properties of ordinary objects that we are in contact with. That is, when 
‘there is an external world’ is one of our HPBs, whenever we believe something about our empirical 
evidence, that belief will be embedded in a worldview shaped by that HPB.  
If we focus on the fact that all our beliefs inform our worldview to different degrees, and 
that it’s difficult to give up beliefs that inform our worldview at a fundamental level, we can explain 
why we cannot give up HPBs, such as the belief that there is an external world, even after realizing 
that there is no evidence that supports them. Let us focus on that HPB. It is plausible that we are 
the type of being that must have as part of their worldview distinctive ways of understanding our 
sense experiences. That is, we need to have at least one HPB that gives us this understanding. In our 
current circumstances, one of those HPBs is that there is an external world. When we do not have 
any evidence against this HPB but we come to realize that there is no evidence that supports it 
either, it would be psychologically impossible to give it up in the absence of a suitable replacement 
because we are the types of being that need to be able to understand their experiences somehow. 
Notice that this explanation moves mutatis mutandis with each of our beliefs across the 
spectrum of importance in our worldview. Important beliefs that are non-fundamental, such as our 
political or religious beliefs, are difficult but not impossible to give up when we notice they are not 
well grounded (and we do not have evidence against them). Inconsequential beliefs are very easy to 
 
51 Different philosophers have claimed that HPBs play the role of enablers of epistemic rationality [see Coliva (2015), 
Pritchard (2018), and Wright (2014)].  I am not departing from that interpretation. My contribution is to specify the way 
in which HPBs enable epistemic rationality; they do it by informing our worldview at a fundamental level.  
86 
 
give up when we notice they are not supported by the evidence (even when we do not have evidence 
against them). Whether we give up our beliefs when we realize they are ungrounded (and we lack 
evidence against them) depends on how important they are in our worldview. If this is true, then as 
long as our HPBs are playing this role of fundamentally informing our worldview, agents would not 
be disposed to give them up just by acknowledging that they are ungrounded.  
Without assuming that HPBs are not beliefs, we now have an alternative explanation of the 
fact that agents are often not disposed to give up their HPBs even in cases where they judge that 
they do not have sufficient evidence for them. Why should we prefer this alternative explanation 
over the one that takes HPBs to be a different mental state than beliefs? For two reasons: 
(1) It uses what seems to be a plausible feature of beliefs. Beliefs seem to be such that they can 
inform our worldview to different degrees. It makes sense that the most important beliefs in 
that worldview are very difficult to give up when we judge that we lack evidence for them.  
(2) It allows us to explain why HPBs and “genuine” beliefs share many features. In most 
circumstances, HPBs seem to behave like ordinary beliefs. Relatedly, HPBs already count as 
beliefs on many other accounts of belief that non-normativist philosophers have offered52: 
HPBs, just like beliefs, are mental entities that have representational content, they have a causal 
role in the production of behavior, they are inferentially promiscuous states, they tend to 
produce behaviors that an observer can interpret as a sign of believing P, etc.  If we think of 
beliefs in any of these ways, then both “regular” beliefs and HPBs are the same kind of mental 
state: they are beliefs. The other explanation that tells us that beliefs and HPBs are different 
 
52 For a sample of different (not normativist) accounts of beliefs see: Dretske (1988), Mandelbaum (2013), (2016), 
Millikan (1984), (2017); Neander (2017).  
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mental states needs to give a good story of why these “distinct” mental states share so many 
features.  
We can summarize the above discussion in two points: (i) if it is true that our beliefs in 
general inform our worldview, we can think of HPBs as informing it at a fundamental level by 
making the rest of our beliefs intelligible. If this is so, then (ii) it is possible that dispositions to 
satisfy Sufficient Evidence would only arise for beliefs that are not shaping our understanding of the 
world at this fundamental level, but not for beliefs which currently are. The mere fact that agents do 
not have the same dispositions in both cases by itself does not entail that beliefs and HPBs are not 
the same mental state.  
In this Section I have argued that there is a class of beliefs (HPBs) that are not subject to 
Sufficient Evidence. Does this mean that we should abandon normativism to explain the nature of 
belief? No. I think that we can still be normativists about the nature of belief, but we have to 
reimagine the normative role that beliefs play. In the following section, I will develop a novel 
normativist view of belief—Commitment Normativism—which takes beliefs’ normative role to be 
one of imposing output-side norms on believers and/or other mental states and not of being subject 
to certain rational input-side norms. On such a normativist view, only output-side requirements are 
constitutive of belief. 
3. Commitment Normativism 
For both Wedgwood and Nolfi, belief is normative because it is essentially subject to a 
fundamental norm. For Wedgwood, belief is fundamentally subject to a truth norm; for Nolfi, belief 
is fundamentally subject to a proper-function norm. In either case, these fundamental norms explain 
both what it is for a belief to be correct, why other non-fundamental (input-side and output-side) 
norms are constitutive of belief, and the necessary dispositions to satisfy such norms believers have. 
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What I have criticized in this paper is their shared view that the input-side norm Sufficient Evidence 
is a norm that beliefs are necessarily subject to. I have argued that beliefs in hinge-propositions are 
not subject to such a requirement of rationality, and so, Sufficient Evidence is not a norm that 
beliefs are necessarily subject to. This suggests that any normativist account of the nature of belief 
that takes Sufficient Evidence to be constitutive of belief is mistaken. Of course, I have not shown 
that there cannot be other input-side norms that are constitutive of belief, but having shown that 
Sufficient Evidence is not such a norm is a significant criticism against conventional normativist 
views like Wedgwood’s and Nolfi’s. From their respective fundamental norms—the truth norm, and 
the proper-function norm—it follows that Sufficient Evidence is a constitutive norm of belief. 
Therefore, if they want to hold on to their views, they need to accept that not all the norms that 
follow from their fundamental norms are constitutive of belief (which makes their views less 
attractive and makes them seem ad hoc) or show that Sufficient Evidence does not follow from them. 
Either option is either undesirable or impossible to do.   
I think that it is possible to give a plausible normativist account of belief which helps us see 
why HPBs still count as beliefs. However, to develop this view successfully, we should understand 
the norms that are constitutive of belief in a different way than Conventional Normativism does. We 
should stop thinking that these constitutive norms are norms that beliefs themselves are subject to. 
Instead, I want to propose a view of belief according to which the norms constitutive of beliefs are 
the normative commitments that one incurs by taking on a belief. I call this novel way of thinking 
about the distinctive normative nature of belief Commitment Normativism. Commitments are by 
definition normative, and if a belief necessarily involves a commitment, then beliefs are essentially 
normative in a distinctive way. Commitments are such that they impose output-side norms on the 
agent and/or her other mental states, and so beliefs are such that they essentially impose output-side 
norms on the agent and/or her other mental states.  
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Let us further develop how commitments are normative and explain the relation between 
them and output-side norms. A commitment can be understood as constituted by a self-impose set 
of output-side norms that we aim to satisfy in light of our commitment. For example, if I commit 
myself to finishing a manuscript I’m working on by tomorrow, then I am binding myself to do all 
the things that are needed for me to finish such a manuscript in time: I will not watch television 
before I’m done, I will use the pomodoro technique to avoid burnout, I will reward myself only after 
I’m done, etc. If I did not do these things but the opposite (if I started watching TV before I’m 
done, if I worked non-stop during a long period of time so that I’m burned out before I finish, or if 
I rewarded myself even before starting so that I have no motivation to accomplish my goal) then it 
would not seem like I was ever really committed to finishing my manuscript by the next day.  
Going back to our subject, it is plausible to claim that whenever we believe that P is true, 
metaphorically speaking, we open ourselves to criticism if we did not act, feel, and think as if P is 
true. My proposal is to think about this feature that is present in all beliefs as an agent’s commitment 
to the truth of a proposition. That is, I claim that beliefs are at least partly constituted by an agent’s 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. As such, by believing that P we impose a set of output-
side requirements on us that allow us to carry out our commitment to the truth of P and to be 
disposed to satisfy such requirements.53   
Commitment Normativism can be captured with two claims. I will call these two claims the 
Normative Claim III and the Descriptive Claim III: 
The Normative Claim III: Beliefs are partly constituted by an agent’s commitment to the truth 
of a proposition. In other words, it is essential to belief to prescribe output-side 
requirements of rationality, like Instrumental Rationality. Such requirements are, broadly 
 
53 Ram Neta (2018) holds that rationally determinable conditions, like beliefs, essentially involve an agent’s commitment 
to something or other. He thinks that being committed to something involves being disposed to act, think, and feel as if 
you are so committed. My commitment view of belief can be seen as one development of Neta’s proposal.  
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speaking, requirements of coherence between believing that P is true and thinking, acting, 
and feeling as if P is true.  
The Descriptive Claim III: Part of what it is to be a belief is for the agent who holds it to 
necessarily have some dispositions to satisfy the output-side requirements of rationality that 
are prescribed by beliefs—like Instrumental Rationality. 
 
The Descriptive Claim III seems plausible. It seems plausibly true that when agents hold 
beliefs, they have (at least to some extent) a set of dispositions to satisfy output-side rational 
requirements that prescribe different ways in which an agent ought to live up to their commitment 
to the truth of P—this is implicit in standard dispositionalist views of belief. If we take note of what 
these dispositions are, we can figure out which output-side requirements of rationality are 
constitutive of belief, thus precisifying the content of the Normative Claim III—given that we have 
already established that only the norms of which the descriptive claim is true are genuinely 
constitutive norms of belief. Let us consider a couple of examples of some output-side requirements 
of rationality that are constitutive of belief on my view. As I already mentioned, these requirements 
are requirements of coherence between the agent’s mental states and the agent’s commitment to the 
truth of a proposition: 
1. It is rationally required that agents do not believe both P and ~P. We are all familiar with 
requirements of this sort, but why is this a rational requirement? Why are we disposed to 
satisfy it? Commitment Normativism can be helpful here to answer these questions. 
According to this view, an agent who believes that P and ~ P would be required to 
rationally act, feel and think as if P and ~P are true, but this is rationally impossible to 
fulfill. It is absurd to think that we can be rationally required to do the impossible. 




2. It is rationally required that if an agent believes that M is the necessary means to E, and she has an end 
E (and has no conflicting end that trumps E), then she intends to M. This requirement is what we 
have called Instrumental Rationality. Commitment Normativism gives us the materials to 
explain why rational agents must have dispositions to satisfy this requirement of rationality. 
According to Commitment Normativism, believing that P is to be committed to the truth 
of that proposition, that is to self-impose some requirements of coherence that would 
allow the agent to act, think and feel as if P is true harmoniously with the rest of her mental 
states.  Being disposed to form the intentions to pursue M is the only coherent path to 
take for an agent who is committed to the truth of ‘M is the necessary means to E’ and 
who also has E as an end, and no conflicting end that trumps E. According to 
Commitment Normativism, Instrumental Rationality is a requirement that an agent would 
self-imposed on herself whenever she believes that some means are necessary to achieve 
an end and also has that end. 
I think that there are more output-side norms of rationality that are constitutive of belief in 
the sense described by Commitment Normativism (like a norm that says that it is rationally required 
to believe the conjunction of two beliefs we already have or a norm that says that it is rationally 
required that if we believe that the conditional ‘if P, then Q’ is true, and we believe the antecedent of 
that conditional, then we believe the consequent). Describing them all is not the purpose of this 
paper. The main purpose of presenting Commitment Normativism is to sketch a normativist view of 
the nature of belief that allows us to explain in an intuitive way what rational norms are constitutive 
of belief (the output-side rational norms), and that allows us to have a better understanding of the 
normative nature of belief. If Commitment Normativism is true, then it can also explain our 
intuition why HPBs are beliefs. Just like any other belief, HPBs are constituted by an agent’s 
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commitment to the truth of a proposition and that commitment imposes output-side norms that 
agents have dispositions to satisfy at least to some extent.  
4. Conclusion 
I have argued against Conventional Normativism that taking beliefs as essentially playing the 
normative role of being subject to the input-side norm Sufficient Evidence is mistaken. Hinge-
proposition beliefs (HPBs) are a set of beliefs that are not subject to this norm. I also argued that it 
is a mistake to hold that an agent has to have dispositions to manage her beliefs in accordance with 
the input-side norm Sufficient Evidence in order to count as a believer. Believers lack such 
dispositions with respect to their HPBs, but they are still believers. I advanced Commitment 
Normativism as a better approach to embrace normativism about the nature of belief. According to 
Commitment Normativism, beliefs essentially play the role of imposing certain output-side norms 
that come from the agent’s commitment to the truth of a proposition. This way of thinking about 
normativism does not take Sufficient Evidence or any input-side norm to be a constitutive norm of 
belief, only output-side norms. Such output-side norms are norms of coherence between the agent’s 














Before concluding this dissertation, I would like to briefly and broadly explore some loose 
ends that I have not addressed in the main body of this dissertation, and to point out to two related 
projects for future research. First, then, I will address a worry about the compatibility of my view 
with closure principles of justification, and then I will develop how I think my project can bring light 
to the debates about pragmatic and moral encroachment. 
1. Closure principles for knowledge and justification, and arational beliefs 
One of the most important claims that I have argued for in this dissertation is that hinge-
commitments are arational beliefs. This claim has an important consequence for the way we think 
about knowledge and justification that I have not addressed in the previous chapters. Broadly 
speaking, many epistemologists think that knowledge and justification are governed by closure 
principles, according to which, if I am justified in believing P, and I justifiably believe (or know) that 
P entails Q, then I am justified in believing Q. But if my view is correct – that is, if hinge-
commitments are arational beliefs – then closure principles cannot be exceptionless. They might 
apply to most ordinary empirical beliefs, but not to hinge-commitments. This is easy to see: if I 
justifiably believe that there is a computer in front of me, and justifiably believe (or know) that this 
proposition entails the hinge-proposition that there is an external world, then according to the 
closure principle, I should be justified in believing that there is an external world. But I have argued 
that I cannot be justified in believing this latter proposition, since hinge-commitments are neither 
justified nor unjustified. So, I must reject the universality of closure principles. This is a bullet that I 
think is worth biting.  
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One reason that many philosophers do not want to give up closure principles for knowledge 
and justification is that they want to avoid embracing a revisionist view about justification and 
knowledge. For example, Duncan Pritchard says that the rejection of closure principles for 
knowledge and justification would be “discontinuous with our ordinary epistemic practices”. 
(Pritchard 2016a:21)54  
Is it really bad to embrace revisionism in this case? One might agree that fully abandoning a 
closure principle is a high cost for a theory of (justified) belief. But even if this is so, it may still be 
that the closure principle should be restricted to ordinary, empirical propositions, and that it should 
not be understood to cover hinge-propositions. Indeed, it is far from clear that our “ordinary 
epistemic practices” include a commitment to the applicability of closure principles specifically to 
hinge-propositions.  
Historically, much philosophical effort has been spent trying to figure out how we can 
deliver the result that hinge-propositions are positively justified. Part of what has motivated this 
effort is an attempt to save fully general closure principles. But, as we have seen in chapters one and 
two, attempts to show that our hinge-commitments are positively justified are beset with difficulties. 
This, I think, just shows that it has always been difficult to make sense of how closure principles can 
apply to our hinge-commitments. To me, that suggests that closure principles are plausibly true only 
when not considered as having a universal domain. And so, my view is not rejecting the plausibility 
of closure principles, but embracing the only plausible way in which closure principles are true; when 
they do not range over hinge-propositions, but only over ordinary empirical propositions. In other 
 
54 According to Pritchard, his view is compatible with closure principles because they only range only over knowledge-
apt beliefs, and, as we have seen in chapter 2, he thinks that hinge-commitments are not beliefs. However, it is still so, 
according to him, that where P is an ordinary empirical belief, and Q is a hinge-commitment, even if we know that P 
entails Q, we cannot be justified in believing Q.  This means, that contrary to what he says, Pritchard is committed to the 
rejection of at least one plausible formulation of the closure principle, the one that says that if I am justified in believing 
P, and I justifiably believe (or know) that P entails Q, then I am justified in believing Q. 
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words, understanding closure principles with this more restricted domain still allows us to acquire 
justification by deduction from one’s other justified beliefs in the cases where this seem to matter—
e.g., in cases where I come to learn that I have justification for other propositions that I was not 
aware I was justified in believing beforehand. For example, if am justified in believing that the 
murderer was left-handed, and I am justified in believing (or I know) that Patrick is the only suspect 
who is left-handed, then I am justified in believing that Patrick is the murderer.  
Some philosophers, following DeRose (1995), have worried that rejecting the universality of 
closure – specifically, with respect to hinge-propositions – would commit us to ‘abominable 
conjunctions’ like  “I am justified in believing that there is a computer in front of me, but I am 
unjustified in believing that there is an external world” (even though the latter proposition is entailed 
by the former).55 Now, it should be easy to see that this exact worry would not affect my view. 
According to the arational beliefs views, our hinge-commitments are neither rational nor irrational, 
that is neither justified nor unjustified. If this is so, then even if closure is restricted, we are not 
committed to ‘abominable conjunctions.’ I get to be justified in believing that there is a computer in 
front of me, and to arationally believe that there is an external world. Maybe for some this 
conjunction is also an abominable conjunction; it sounds strange that I am justified in believing that 
there is a computer in front of me but that at the same time I am not justified in believing that there 
is an external world (even if I am not unjustified in believing that there is an external world). 
However, an abominable conjunction in its original form is not only abominable because it sounds 
strange, but mostly, I think, because it seems to denote some sort of rational paradox that apparently 
follows from rejecting closure. It seems that rejecting closure leads us to cases where a rational belief 
about an ordinary empirical proposition entails a hinge-proposition (e.g., that there is an external 
 
55 De Rose’s worry is directed at closure principle of knowledge where knowledge is closed under knowledge entailment, 
but for our purposes that does not matter.  
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world) that we are unjustified in believing. But if we are unjustified in believing a proposition then it 
seems that we should stop believing it. At the same time, however, that proposition is entailed by a 
rational belief that we have and so we should believe it – those two instructions seem to be 
contradictory, and the fact that the abominable conjunction seems to entail those two incompatible 
demands is what makes it abominable.  
But the new “abominable conjunction” is not like that – at least not if we accept my view 
about the rational status of hinge-commitments. The fact that we are not justified in believing that 
there is an external world does not imply (on my view) that we should give up that belief – and 
hence the second “abominable conjunction” does not entail two contradictory demands. So even if 
with the arational beliefs views we need to reject the universality of closure, that does not commit us 
with the worst kind of abominable conjunctions.  
Finally, one reason why closure principles are attractive is that it might seem that we can 
extend our justified beliefs by deduction: from our justified belief that P, and our justified belief that 
P entails Q, we can come to justifiably believe, on the basis of those two justified beliefs, that Q. 
But, as I argued in chapter 1, there are cases where one intuitively cannot come to justifiably believe 
Q in this way, because even though P entails Q, P is not “independent” evidence for Q: to believe P 
in the first place (and thus to believe that P supports Q), one must already be presupposing Q. And 
cases where Q is a hinge-proposition are cases (though not the only cases) of this sort: someone 
who does not already believe a relevant hinge-proposition cannot gain justification to believe it on 
the basis of an ordinary empirical belief that entails it, because in taking the ordinary empirical belief 
to be true, one is already presupposing the hinge-proposition itself. So, while it may hold good in 
many cases, the intuition that we should be able to extend our justified beliefs by deduction is 
misguided when hinge-propositions are involved.  
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I think there is a more general point to be made against being afraid of revisionism. My 
whole view about the nature of hinge-commitments and its consequences for the normativity of 
beliefs are revisionist; they do not align with traditional ways in which epistemologists think about 
the nature of belief and justification, and they go against other core commitments epistemologists 
have when they think about the rationality of belief (like the idea that necessarily all beliefs are either 
rational or irrational).  But I have defended them because I think they give us a new and plausible 
perspective from where we can understand epistemic rationality. Avoiding revisionism at all costs 
includes the cost of thinking about important topics from one perspective – the traditional or 
canonical one – that may be mistaken. So, I think that avoiding revisionism just for the sake of 
avoiding revisionism is not a justified practice.  
2. Pragmatic encroachment and beliefs as commitments 
 Now, I would like to discuss other interesting applications that my project might have in 
other debates where the rationality of beliefs is at stake. In the previous chapters I argued that hinge-
commitments are arational beliefs and that a better way to understand the normativity of beliefs is as 
involving an agent’s commitment to the truth of a proposition. We can think of these results as 
constituting two views: that Arational Beliefs View of hinge-commitments and the Commitment 
View of belief. Although I think there are interesting projects for both views, I would like to focus 
on two that involve the Commitment View of belief.  
First, take pragmatic encroachment cases—those cases in which it appears that the rationality of 
forming a belief depends not only on evidential or other purely epistemic factors but also on 
pragmatic ones56. If we adopt the Commitment View of Belief, we can explain why such cases occur. 
According to the Commitment View, holding a belief commits one to doing things in light of this 
 
56 See Fantl & McGrath, (2002). 
98 
 
belief—including forming other beliefs. Of course, precisely what a believer is committed to doing 
in light of her belief will depend on what else she believes, including what she believes about what is 
valuable or important. For instance, suppose you have strong but not conclusive evidence that your 
train leaves at 3:00pm, so that it might be prima facie rational for you to believe that the train leaves at 
3:00pm. But suppose you also believe that it is very important for you not to miss that particular 
train.  If you are really committed to this belief about the pragmatic consequence of missing a 
particular train, this might then impact what else you should think, feel, and do. It would, for 
example, make it the case that it would not be rational for you to form the belief that the train leaves 
at 3:00pm without gathering more evidence for this belief first. In this way, the Commitment View 
might make space for showing how pragmatic factors (or rather our beliefs about the pragmatic 
factors) can sometimes influence what other beliefs it is rational for me to have.  
3. Moral encroachment and beliefs as commitments 
I also think that the Commitment View can be fruitful for the related debate about moral 
encroachment. Different philosophers have argued that moral facts can influence whether a belief is 
rational. For example, Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder (2019) have presented an evidentialist view 
about epistemic rationality that nevertheless makes room for moral encroachment. According to 
them, beliefs are only rational when they are based on sufficient evidence, but in cases when 
something morally important is at issue, the bar for how much evidence counts as sufficient 
evidence is higher. 
I am interested in the question of whether it is really the moral norms themselves that make 
a difference to what it is rational for us to believe, or rather our beliefs about those moral norms. 
Consider, for example, a case that is often discussed in the moral encroachment literature: it seems 
wrong to believe (on the basis of merely statistical information) that a black person at a party is a 
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staff member rather than a guest. The idea might be that the oppression that people of color face in 
the US is just the kind of moral factor that might raise the bar for how much evidence I would have 
to have in order to hold this belief rationally. But it seems to me that while it might be irrational for 
someone from the US to hold that belief, the same doesn’t obviously seem to be true for someone 
who has lived her whole life in a society that has never faced issues of racism, and who has just 
moved to the US without having been told anything about its racist history. This observation makes 
me think that at least part of what accounts for the irrationality of someone holding that particular 
belief are not the moral facts57 (for those are presumably the same in the two cases), but rather 
something about the beliefs and desires of the individual person. At least arguably, someone who 
has never been exposed to evidence of racism (e.g., someone who has lived all of their life in a 
society without racism) can rationally form the belief that the person at the party is a member of 
staff on the basis of the statistical evidence, whereas someone else who has lived her whole life in 
the US and has thereby encountered evidence concerning race relations in the US cannot rationally 
form that belief.  
How might one explain this difference? I think that the Commitment View could deliver 
valuable insights here. According to the Commitment View of Belief, having a particular belief 
commits one to thinking, acting and feeling as if this belief is true. In part, that might require one to 
form other beliefs that follow from it. In this way, the Commitment View might make space for 
showing how factors about our psychology (i.e., our beliefs and perhaps desires) rather than the 
 
57 For simplicity, I assume that moral requirements on beliefs are not evidence-relative, so that the moral facts really are 
the same for the two individuals. However, my contention that the Commitment View of belief can be helpful to better 
understand cases of moral encroachment does not depend on this assumption. We can present a different case in which 
both agents share the same evidence but have different commitments about, let us say, fighting oppression. A view that 
claims that moral requirements on beliefs are evidence-relative would say that both people in this new case would be 
rationally required to look for more evidence before forming the belief that a black person at a party is a staff member. 
However, I think this diagnosis is mistaken. There is a difference between these two subjects, given what they believe 
about fighting oppression: it is irrational for one to form the belief without gathering more evidence whereas it makes 




moral facts themselves make a difference to what’s rational for us to believe in these cases at issue. 
Someone who believes that black people in the US are often oppressed and who does not want to 
participate in this oppression might thus be committed to “act, think and feel” as if these things are 
true — including refraining from forming a belief that would contribute to this oppression. 
Conversely, a person who does not have these beliefs and desires might not be committed to doing 
those things, and so there might be nothing wrong with that person forming the belief that the black 
person at the party is really a member of staff (if she has good evidence for that claim). I would like 
to explore cases like this in more detail and see whether moral norms really do influence what it is 
rational for us to believe, or whether the same phenomena can really be better explained through the 
kind of view of belief I’ve advanced in my dissertation. 
Like the project I have explored in this dissertation, these future projects examining 
pragmatic and moral encroachment aim to shed light on our understanding of the nature of belief 
and the scope of rationality when applied to beliefs. These future applications give just a taste of the 
important respects in which the Arational Beliefs View and the Commitment View of Beliefs can be 
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